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Abstract
This Comment will discuss the labor conditions in China that prompted many provisions in
the recently enacted Labor Contract Law, and how the new law responds to deficiencies of China’s
Labor Law to address various labor problems. Part I of this Comment contains a brief presentation
of the historical and economic background of the emergence of migrant workers. Part I also exam-
ines the causes of the main problems faced by migrant workers, in particular the insufficiencies of
China’s Labor Law in protecting migrant workers. Part II looks into the legislation’s background
and specific provisions of China’s new Labor Contract Law that supplement the Labor Law and
stress the protection of laborers. Many provisions of the new law specifically address labor abuses
faced by migrant workers. Finally, Part III discusses the insufficiencies and likely effects of the
new Labor Contract Law.
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INTRODUCTION
China currently has approximately 200 million migrant
workers. It is well documented that migrant workers in China
encounter various difficulties and labor abuses such as low
wages, unsafe work conditions, overtime work with little or no
compensation, wage arrears and nonpayment, and lack of social
security.2 As migrant workers have become a major labor force
in China's industrial development, China has gradually recog-
nized the critical importance of safeguarding their rights and in-
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Dispute Resolution at Fordham University School of Law for sponsoring this research in
China in 2007. The author also wants to thank Annie Chen and other editors of this law
journal for their great help.
1. See General Report Drafting Team, General Report of Research on Problems of
China's Migrant Workers, in PROJECT TEAM OF THE RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE COUN-
CIL, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG DIAOYAN BAOcGAO [SURVEY AND RESEARCH REPORT ON
CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS] 1, 4 (2006) (stating that China currently has 200 million mi-
grant workers); see also Zheng Gongcheng & Huangli Ruolian, The Issue and Social Protec-
tion of Chinese Migrant Workers: Theoretical Judgment and Policy Thinking, in ZHONGGUO
NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RURAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA:
ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION] 3, 9 (Zheng Gongcheng & Huangli Ruolian, eds., 2007)
(estimating the population of migrant workers to be around 210 million). All transla-
tions in this Comment are transliterated in the Pinyin system. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, all translations from Chinese sources are the author's. Titles of Chinese books,
newspapers, and periodicals are transliterated and translated; titles of articles in books,
periodicals, and newspapers are only translated.
2. See JIANG YUE, ET AL., ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG LAODONG QUANLI BAOHU
YANJIU [STUDY ON PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF LABOR OF PEASANT WORKERS IN CHINA] 87-
121 (2006) (discussing the main problems faced by migrant workers); see also Sean
Cooney, Making The Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the
People's Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1050, 1050, 1053-54 (2007) (summariz-
ing various forms of labor abuse in China and noting that migrant workers are regularly
accorded treatment inferior to their urban counterparts and they bear the brunt of
labor abuses); SHEN LIREN, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG [CHINESE MIGRANT WORKERS]
119-38 (2005) (discussing the problems faced by migrant workers such as employment
discrimination, lack of social security, low wage and wage arrear, etc.).
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terests.3 Since 2000, China's national government, and subse-
quently its local governments, have made a series of serious ef-
forts to improve the conditions of migrant workers, by repealing
discriminatory regulations and taking protective measures.4 Mi-
grant workers also have attracted enormous scholarly attention
and won widespread public sympathy and media support.5
In June 2007, China passed its first Labor Contract Law (or
Employment Contract Law) that manifestly leans toward protec-
tion of labor rights.6 Drafts of this law drew an unusual amount
of public attention and were highly debated.7 Some view this
3. See General Report Drafting Team, supra note 1, at 7 (recognizing migrant
workers as an important component of China's industrial labor force); id. at 18 (stating
that Chinese government's understanding of the issue of migrant workers has gradually
progressed and that proper resolution of this issue is of key strategic importance); see
also HAN CHANGBIN, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG DE FAZHAN HE ZHONGJIE [THE DEVELOP-
MENT AND END OF CHINESE MIGRANT WORKERS] 129 (2007) (describing the transforma-
tion of migrant workers into industrial workers as a historic transformation and assert-
ing the need to assign to migrant workers a just social economic position).
4. See JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 43-45, 50-53. The national government on
various occasions requires, inter alia, that migrant workers be treated equally as urban
residents with respect to employment, child education and workers compensation, that
various fees imposed on migrant workers be abolished, that migrant workers receive no
less than minimum wage. Many local governments adopt similar measures aiming at
alleviating the burdens and restrictions placed upon migrant workers. See generally infra
notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing the positive shift in China's policy to-
wards migrant workers since 2001).
5. See SHEN, supra note 2, at 2 (pointing out that migrant workers have become a
hot public topic and have been the subject of scholarly discussions); see also Wang
Fenyu and Zhao Yandong, The Obtaining of Economic Status by Migrating Rural Workers and
the Determinative Factors, in NONGMINGONG: ZHONGGUO JINCHENG NONGMINGONG DE
JINGJI SHEHUI FENXI [RURAL WORKERS: SOCIAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S RURAL
WORKERS IN CITIES] 134, 135 (Li Peilin ed., 2003) (observing that the wave of migrant
workers has attracted scholars' serious attention and referring to studies on migrant
workers).
6. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [Labor Contract Law of
the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1,
2008) http://www.molss.gov.cn/gb/news/2007-06/30/content_184630.htm [hereinaf-
ter Labor Contract Law] (P.R.C.). The English translation in this Comment's text is
generally the author's own, but direct quotations of Labor Contract Law provisions in
this Comment's footnotes are from the law firm Baker & McKenzie's translation. See
Law Of The People's Republic Of China On Employment Contracts, http://www.
amcham-shanghai.org/NR/rdonlyres/DE724602-2608-4FF5-94E2-DDD280552I C3/44
70/EmploymentContractLaw BakerMcKenzie.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2009); see gener-
ally Associated Press, China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
June 29, 2007 (referring to China's Labor Contract Law as new labor law), available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/29/business/AS-FIN-China-Labor-Law.php.
7. See China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, supra note 6, 6 (reporting that
China's government received more than 190,000 comments on the draft law from the
public and companies); see also Ting-I Tsai, China's Labor Law A Last Straw For Taiwanese,
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new Labor Contract Law, effective on January 1, 2008,8 as a mile-
stone in the protection of labor rights in China,' while others see
insufficiencies in this law and remain cautious as to its real ef-
fects.'
This Comment will discuss the labor conditions in China
that prompted many provisions in the recently enacted Labor
Contract Law, and how the new law responds to deficiencies of
China's Labor Law to address various labor problems. Part I of
this Comment contains a brief presentation of the historical and
economic background of the emergence of migrant workers.
Part I also examines the causes of the main problems faced by
migrant workers, in particular the insufficiencies of China's La-
bor Law in protecting migrant workers. Part II looks into the
legislation's background and specific provisions of China's new
Labor Contract Law that supplement the Labor Law and stress
the protection of laborers. Many provisions of the new law spe-
cifically address labor abuses faced by migrant workers. Finally,
Part III discusses the insufficiencies and likely effects of the new
Labor Contract Law.
ASIAN TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, 8, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
China_B usiness/IL14CbO2.html (reporting that the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress of China received 191,800 separate comments on the draft
Labor Contract Law).
8. See Tsai, supra note 7, 3 (reporting that Labor Contract Law is scheduled to
become effective on January 1, 2008); see also Lyle Morris, An Uncertain Victory for China's
Workers, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, June 24, 2008, 3, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/dis-
play.article?id=10983 (observing that Labor Contract Law went effective on January 1,
2008).
9. See Morris, supra note 8, 1 (observing that the passage of Labor Contract Law
has been heralded as a breakthrough for improving labor rights in China); see also Ari-
ana Eunjung Cha, New Law Gives Chinese Workers Power, Gives Businesses Nightmares, WASH-
INGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE, Apr. 14, 2008, 3, 4, at A01, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/13 /AR2008041302214.html
(referring to Labor Contract Law as a landmark law and a major victory for Chinese
workers).
10. Morris, supra note 8, 9 17, 18 (reporting that critics point out that Labor
Contract Law's goal of reducing worker-abuse cases might be difficult to achieve, de-
pending on local labor bureaus' enforcement of and companies' compliance with the
law); see also Jude Blanchette, Key Issue for China's New Labor Law: Enforcement, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 2, 2007, 3, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
200 7 /0702/pl ls02-woap.html (citing concern that Labor Contract Law's impact lies in
how the government interprets and enforces it); Cha, supra note 9, 9 (citing concerns
that Labor Contract Law, being too harsh on companies, protects the lazy); id. 12
(citing a survey showing that a fifth of companies with foreign ownership or investment
have concrete plans to move some or all operations out of China).
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I. MIGRANT WORKERS: HISTORY, POLICY, CONDITIONS,
AND CAUSES
A. Historical Overview: China's Household Registration System,
Economic Reforms and Implications for Migrant Workers
People in China call migrant workers Nongmingong, the lit-
eral translation of which is "peasant workers."11 "Peasant" indi-
cates their household registration status as rural residents, while
"workers" refers to their occupation as workers in cities.' 2
To appreciate some of the special problems faced by
China's migrant workers today, one needs to understand China's
unique Household Registration System-the so called Hukou sys-
tem-that has been in place since 1958.13 Under the so-called
Urban-Rural Dual System,' 4 people living in rural areas are regis-
tered with "agricultural" household status, while people in the
cities are registered with "non-agricultural" or "urban" house-
hold status. 15 Classification in the Household Registration Sys-
tem had a life-changing economic consequence. In the era of
the planned economy, the government assigned a job to every-
11. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 (stating that Nongmingong is the most com-
monly used term in referring to migrant workers and explaining the origin of other
names used for migrant workers).
12. See id. (explaining that "peasant" indicates migrant workers' identity under the
household registration system and "worker" refers to their occupation); See also Sun
Liping, New Urban-Rural Dual Structure and Migration of Rural Workers, in NONGMINGONG:
ZHONGGUO JINCHENG NONGMINGONG DE JINGJI SHEHUI FENXI [RURAL WORKERS: SOCIAL
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS IN CITIES] supra note 5, at 149, 149-52
(asserting that "peasant" indicates migrant workers' social identity and "worker" refers
to their occupation). Following customary usages, in this Comment "migrant workers"
and "rural workers" are used interchangeably to refer to "peasant workers."
13. See Hayden Windrow & Anik Guha, The Hukou System, Migrant Workers, and State
Power in the People's Republic of China, 3 Nw.J. INr'L HUM. RTS. 3, 4-14 (2005) (explaining
the development of China's Hukou system); see also Li Ling, Towards A More Civil Society:
Mingong and Expanding Social Space in Reform-Era China, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv.
149, 155-58 (2001) (discussing the Hukou system and its effects on urban residents,
peasants, and migrant workers).
14. See Sun, supra note 12, at 149-52 (discussing China's urban-rural dual structure
that is based on the Household Registration System under planned economy in 1950s-
1990s); see also LI QIANG, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG YU SHEHUI FENCENG [URBAN MI-
GRANT WORKERS AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN CHINA] 32 (2004) (explaining briefly the
Urban-Rural Dual System).
15. See Sun, supra note 12, at 151 (stating that the household registration system
divides rural and urban residents into two different social identities); see also LI, supra
note 14, at 32 (observing that distinction between "agricultural" and "urban" household
registration statuses is to prevent rural residents from migrating into cities).
2009] CHINA'S NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW 1087
one in cities.' 6 As city residents had life-long job security and
enjoyed various benefits provided by state-owned or collectively
owned enterprises and city governments, 17 they possessed what
was called an "iron rice bowl," meaning a secure and tenured
job.i" An "iron rice bowl" was very valuable because it provided
urban residents with a high standard of living compared to their
rural counterparts. 19 China's priority in building a modern in-
dustrial system in urban areas was largely responsible for the eco-
nomic inequality between urban and rural areas.20  Given the
wide economic gap between the cities and the countryside, rural
residents had a strong incentive to move into the cities.21 It is
China's strict household registration system that prevented the
relocation of rural residents to cities.22
16. See Sun, supra note 12, at 151 (stating that the state considered it its responsi-
bility to find employment for the non-agricutural population in cities); see also Windrow
& Guha, supra note 13, at 13 (stating that China's policies allocated urban employment,
among other benefits, to holders of urban Hukou registration).
17. See JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 123 (enumerating a variety of social welfare
benefits provided for urban employees, such as food, dining, housing, bathing, trans-
portation, and child education, etc.); see also Windrow & Guha, supra note 13, at 13
(stating that China's policies allocated "free compulsory education, urban employment,
public housing, free medical services, and retirement benefits" to holders of urban
Hukou registration).
18. See Li, supra note 14, at 97 (referring to "iron rice bowl" as government-as-
signed lifetime employment); see also Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y.K. Woo, The Worthy
Unemployed: Societal Stratification and Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the
United States, 33 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 461-64 ( 1995) (discussing the benefits of
an "iron rice bowl" to an employee).
19. See Sun, supra note 12, at 151-52 (discussing that government spending in cities
has been a lot more than that in rural areas, that city residents enjoy enormously more
benefits than rural residents, and that the government's social security expenditure per
capita in cities was twenty-nine times that in countryside in 1999).
20. SeelWindrow & Guha, supra note 13, at 4 (mentioning Beijing's plan to extract
China's agricultural economic surplus to fuel urban industrialization); see also HAN,
supra note 3, at 16 (observing that China's strategic priority in developing heavy indus-
tries sacrificed the interests of peasants).
21. See Li, supra note 14, at 47 (concluding that the enormous economic gap be-
tween urban and rural areas drove peasants to move into cities); see also SHEN, supra
note 2, at 81 (contending that the urban-rural income gap is the driving force behind
peasant workers' migration to cities).
22. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 33-39 (explaining that state-owned enterprises
could occasionally recruit limited numbers of temporary workers from the countryside,
but these rural workers were not given urban household registration status and had to
return home when employment ended. Without employment, rural residents were not
allowed to live in cities; were detained and sent back to the rural area); see also Li, supra
note 14, at 31 (observing that the government relied on the Household Registration
System to stop rural residents from migrating into cities); LiuJingming, Study on Chinese
Peasants'Job Migration in the Context of Modernization, in NONGMINGONG: ZHONGGUO
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A large population of migrant workers started to emerge af-
ter China began economic reforms in the late 1970s.23 With the
development of the economy and the private sector, China now
allows rural residents to find employment in cities.24 Conse-
quently, the population of rural workers in cities increased from
less than two million in the early 1980s to eighty million in
1995.25 However, these migrant workers, without an urban
household registration status, were not eligible for benefits and
public services provided by city governments.2 6
The wave of migrant workers flowing into and between cit-
ies burdened city governments and caused social problems.27
The government and public media gave it a derogatory name,
"blind flow."'28 National and city governments also began to im-
JINCHENG NONGMINGONG DE JINGJI SHEHUI FENXI [RURAL WORKERS: SOCIAL ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS IN CITIES] supra note 5, at 74-76 (discussing the
restrictive effect of the Household Registration System on rural residents' migration to
cities).
23. See Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and Into the Fire: Well-Intended But Mis-
guided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in China, 98 Nw.
U. L. REv. 991, 1003 (2004) (noting that post-Mao economic reforms have led to a
massive influx of poor and poorly-educated migrant workers into cities looking for
jobs); see also Windrow & Guha, supra note 13, at 16 (noting the renewed migration of
millions of rural Chinese to urban areas in search of greater prosperity following
China's economic reforms).
24. See Li Lulu, Migration to Cities: An Irreversible Process, in NONGMINGONG: ZHONG-
GUO JINCHENG NONGMINGONG DE JINGJI SHEHUI FENXI [RURAL WORKERS: SOCIAL Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS IN CITIES] supra note 5, at 116 (stating that
development of non-state-owned economy in cities provided many new jobs for rural
workers); see also JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 37-38 (noting that as new jobs were
created, state-owned enterprises in mining, construction, and transportation industries
were allowed to recruit rural residents as temporary contract workers).
25. See General Report Drafting Team, supra note 1, at 3 (estimating that the pop-
ulation of migrant workers was thirty million in 1989 and sixty-two million in 1993).
26. See Li Lulu, supra note 24, at 118 (acknowledging that rural workers are denied
many public services because they do not have urban household registration); see also
HAN, supra note 3, at 143 (explaining that even if migrant workers have lived in cities
for many years, they are not viewed as city residents and are denied a variety of public
services).
27. See LI, supra note 14, at 223 (acknowledging the problems resulting from large
scale population migration into cities, such as pressure on urban housing, transporta-
tion, utility supplies, sanitation, and public safety); see also Li Lulu, supra note 24, at 117
(noting government worries that the migrant population may cause a series of
problems in cities, such as pressure of employment, poverty, conflicts between migrant
population and local residents, and challenges to city management).
28. See JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 3841 (discussing a series of national govern-
ment notices and policy documents aiming at curbing the "blind flow"); see also Li,
supra note 14, at 87 (stating that many people call the migration of rural workers "blind
flow" because they view the migration as unorganized, out of order, and chaotic); SHEN,
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pose strict restrictions on rural workers to constrain this flow. 29
In 1994, China enacted its first Labor Law that required employ-
ment contracts for all workers, including urban residents.3 0 Sub-
sequently, the "iron rice bowl" became breakable when state-
owned enterprises with economic hardships laid off numerous
urban workers.3 To reserve jobs for the laid-off urban citizens,
the government imposed even stricter restrictions on migrant
workers.32
supra note 2, at 63 (explaining that the government called the rural workers' migration
"blind flow" because it is not in order with the planned economy).
29. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 39 (mentioning that in 1989 nearly one mil-
lion rural residents without employment in cities were detained and sent back home);
see also, Li, supra note 14, at 246, 254 (stating that in 1999 Beijing detained and sent
back nearly 150,000 rural residents, that across the country bullying and beating of
detainees were not uncommon, and that in 2003 China officially ended its detention-
repatriation practice against unwanted rural residents in cities); Li Ling, supra note 13,
at 158 (discussing China's regulations on migrant workers in 1990s); Peerenboom,
supra note 23, at 1003-04 (discussing briefly the rise and fall of China's detention-repa-
triation practice and its bearing on rural migrant workers).
30. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [The Labor Law of the P.R.C.]
(promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1994, effective May 1, 1995) http://
www.molss.gov.cn/gb/ywzn/2006-03/02/content_108641.htm (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Labor Law]. The translation of Labor Law in this Comment's text is the author's own,
but direct quotations of Labor Law provisions in this Comment's footnotes are from an
English translation. See Ministry of Commerce, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aar-
ticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200411/20041100311016.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2008)
(P.R.C.).
31. See Jian Xinhua & ZhangJianwei, Migrant Workers and the Relocation of Surplus
Rural Labor Force, in ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RuRAL-URBAN
MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA: ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION] supra note 1, at 269, 269-
70 (observing that in the mid-1990s many Chinese city governments adopted discrimi-
natory policies against migrant workers to protect a large number of urban workers laid
off by state-owned enterprises); see alsoJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 40 n.13 (noting that
in 1994, there were 7.8 million unemployed urban workers and that between 1998 to
2001, 25.5 million urban workers were laid off); see generally Hong Yung Lee, Xiagang,
the Chinese Style of Laying Off Workers, 6 ASIAN SURVEY 914 (2000) (examining how the
Chinese State has been handling the problem of excess workers in its state-owned enter-
prises).
32. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 41, 88, 125 (acknowledging that city govern-
ments required migrant workers to obtain various papers and certificates, such as mi-
gration certificate, work permit, employment certificate, temporary residency certifi-
cate, and reproduction certificate, etc.); see also Li Ling, supra note 13, at 159 (noting
that Chinese government, facing pressures to keep and generate jobs for local urban
residents, enacted strict rules to constrain the ability of local employers to hire migrant
workers); Sun, supra note 12, at 154 (observing that some cities deliberately discharged
migrant workers in order to employ urban workers who were laid off from other posi-
tions).
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B. Significant Positive Shift in China's Policy on Rural Workers
Since 2000
Since the beginning of this new century, China has started
to adopt protective policies toward rural workers. China now
perceives the protection of rural workers' rights and interests as
one of its national policies.3 4 A recent example is the approval
of Several Opinions of the State Council on Resolving the
Problems of Rural Workers in January 2006, during a regular
meeting of the State Council (the highest national administra-
tive body) presided over by Premier Wen Jiabao.3 5 This is the
first comprehensive national policy document on rural work-
ers.36 It addresses every aspect of all the problems affecting mi-
33. See Opinions on Working Well in Agriculture and Rural Areas in 2002 (issued
by the State Council), available at http://www.cq.gov.cn/zwgk/zfgb/gb2002/dierqi/
200412246888.HTM (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (P.R.C.) (asking local governments to
provide services and fair treatment to rural workers and protect their legitimate rights
and interests); see also Notice on Working Well in the Management of and Services for
Peasants Working in Cities (issued by the State Council) (Jan. 2003), available at http://
www.bjld.gov.cn/tszl/swfzxc/t20030319_5955.htm (P.R.C.) (affirming migrant workers'
right to equal employment, work pay, work safety, training, and child education); Opin-
ions on Several Policies to Promote Increase in the Income of Peasants (issued by the
State Council) (Jan. 2004), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-
02/08/content_1303656.htm (P.R.C.) (recognizing migrant workers as an important
industrial labor force and requiring local governments to further clear discriminatory
regulations and unreasonable fees on migrant workers, and include services to migrant
workers in the normal fiscal budget).
34. See Yue Jinglun, Rural Workers and Labor Policy, in ZHONGGuO NONGMINGONG
WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RuRAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA: IssUES AND SOCIAL
PROTECTION] supra note 1, at 302, 309-23 (detailing the protective policies and measures
adopted by the national government in the past few years to safeguard the interests of
migrant workers and concluding that the issue of migrant workers has become the sub-
ject of special attention of the national government and has entered the nation's
agenda at the highest level); see also Willy Lam, Stability Trumps Reform at China's Parlia-
mentary Session, 8 JAMESTOwN FOUNDATION CHINA BRIEF 6 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.jamestown.org/china-brief/article.php?articleid=2374035 (stating that, in
his inaugural address to the First Session of the 11th National People's Congress in
early April, 2008, Premier WenJiabao remarked that lessening the financial hardship of
"under-classes" such as peasants and migrant workers has become the top priority of the
new cabinet).
35. See Several Opinions of the State Council on Resolving the Problems of Rural
Workers (issued by the State Council) (Mar. 27, 2006), available at http://www.gov.cn/
jrzg/2006-03/27/content_237644.htm (P.R.C.); see also Xie Qiong, Index of Policy Regula-
tions and Important Documents on the Issue and Social Protection of Migrant Workers since the
Reform and Opening-Up, in ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RURAL-
URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA: ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION] supra note 1, at
669, 687-98 (reprinting this governmental document).
36. See Yue, supra note 34, at 311 (stating that this is the central government's first
comprehensive and systematic policy document on rural workers).
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grant workers and has, among other things, the following objec-
tives: resolving the problems of low wages and wage arrears,
bringing labor management of rural workers in line with legal
regulations, providing employment service, occupational train-
ing, social security, urban public services, and improving the
safeguard mechanism that protects rural workers' rights and in-
terests.37 In accordance with the shift in China's national policy
on migrant workers, the national government, along with many
local governments, has taken a variety of measures to improve
the conditions of rural workers.3
There are several reasons for this positive policy change.
People believe that the foremost reason for the policy change is
that poor treatment of rural workers poses a serious threat to
China's social stability. 9 A vast portion of the Chinese popula-
tion has been left behind during China's economic reforms, cre-
ating a comparatively poor class mainly comprised of unem-
ployed and low-income urban residents, rural workers and peas-
ants. 40 As people perceive wealth to be unfairly distributed,
37. See Several Opinions of the State Council on Resolving the Problems of Rural
Workers, supra note 35, §§ 3-8 (identifying the many problems faced by migrant work-
ers and specifying the various measures the government needs to take to improve the
condition of rural workers).
38. See Huangli Ruolian & Zheng Gongcheng, The Issue and Social Protection of Chi-
nese Migrant Workers: Current Situation, Difficulties and Solution Analysis, in ZHONGGUO
NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RuRAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA:
IssuEs AND SOCIAL PROTEcriON] supra note 1, at 30, 106-12 (documenting a number of
measures taken by the national government since 2003 for the benefit of migrant work-
ers); see also Ronald C. Brown, China's Collective Contract Provisions: Can Collective Negotia-
tions Embody Collective Bargaining?, 16 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 51 (2006) (citing a
report that Beijing Municipal Government in the first six months of 2004 helped
110,000 migrant workers recover 290 million yuan (US$35 million) of unpaid wages,
causing the first decline in labor disputes in Beijing since 2000);JIANG ET AL., supra note
2, at 43 (discussing that since 2000 local governments at various levels began to gradu-
ally repeal unreasonable restrictions on migrant workers); id. at 73-78 (enumerating
some of the measures taken by local governments in the interests of migrant workers).
39. See Brown, supra note 38, at 51 (asserting that when adding up some of the ill
side-effects of economic reforms, such as slow-rising wages, widening wage gaps, and
unpaid wages of migrant workers, one can understand why the central government has
had as a high priority putting a social security safety net in place with accompanying
Labor Law protections); see also Yue, supra note 34, at 309 (asserting that one of the
main reasons for the policy change is the affect of migrant workers on China's labor
relation stability and social harmony).
40. See Li Qiang, New Trends in Current Changes in China's Societal Structure, §§ 1-2,
http://zyzx.mca.gov.cn/article//mjzl/lq/200712/20O71200009109.shtml (discussing
recent striking economic gaps between China's social classes and affects on social stabil-
ity); see also Brown, supra note 38, at 47 (referring to migrant workers as an underclass
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social tension, or even resentment, has grown to an ever worri-
some level.41 China's current administration, which succeeded
to power in 2003, set the goal of building a "harmonious society"
by spreading the gains of economic growth to the large popula-
tion at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.4 2 The current
administration has made progress in establishing a social secur-
ity system for poor urban residents, abolished the agricultural
tax in 2006, 43 increased spending significantly in the country-
side,44 and is building a universal healthcare system and a mini-
in China); Kang Xinqiao, Analysis of the Four Major Social Classes in China Today, § 2,
6-7, http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=11209 (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (catego-
rizing peasants, migrant workers, unemployed, and low-income city residents as either
poor or nearly poor).
41. See Jiang Wenran, The Dynamics of China's Social Crisis, 6 JAMESTOwN FOUNDA-
TION CHINA BRIEF 2, 7 4-10 (2006), available at http://jamestown.org/images/pdf/
cb_006_002.pdf (observing growing economic inequality and social unrest); see also
Brown, supra note 38, at 50 (citing World Bank President WoLfensohn as noting that in
2003 China had 10 million citizens engaged in protests, not only over labor issues (such
as layoffs and wages), but also over rising rural taxes and forced relocation in urban
areas); China's Social Stability, VOICE OF AMERICA, Aug. 6, 2005, 3, available at http://
www.voanews.com/uspolicy/archive/2005-08/2005-08-15-voa2.cfm (reporting that the
Chinese Minister of Public Security acknowledged at a closed meeting of Chinese offi-
cials that nearly four million Chinese took part in seventy-four thousand protests in
2004).
42. SeeJiang, supra note 41, 14 (commenting that the current Chinese leader-
ship headed by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao is keenly aware of the
growing disparity and its serious consequences and that the "harmonious society"
Seems to have become a central pillar of the Hu-Wen approach to easing China's social
tensions); see also Maureen Fan, China's Party Leadership Declares New Priority: 'Harmoni-
ous Society, 'WASHINGTON PosT FOREIGN SERVICE, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18, available at http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11 /AR2006101101610.
html (reporting that Chinese President Hu Jintao plans to narrow the wealth gap, in-
crease employment and improve public service); Morris, supra note 8, 2 (stating that
Labor Contract Law signals the Chinese government taking steps to rein in the gap
between economic expansion and poor condition of workers); id. 1 3 (observing that
Labor Contract Law is in line with the efforts of President Hu Jintao to promote a
"harmonious society").
43. See China's Legislature Abolishes 2600-Year-Old Agricultural Tax, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE (China), Dec. 30, 2005, 1 1, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/30/
eng20051230_231752.html (reporting that China rescinds agricultural tax as ofJanuary
1, 2006); see also Xing Qinjiao, Agricultural Tax To Be Scrapped From 2006, CHINA DAILY,
Mar. 6, 2005, 1 1, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/06/con-
tent_422126.htm (reporting that China rescinded agricultural tax).
44. See Edward Cody, China Plans To Boost Spending in Rural Areas: Goal Is to Curb
Growing Unrest, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE, Mar. 5, 2006, at A19, 2, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/04/AR200603
0401483-pf.html (reporting that Premier Wen Jiabao announced "plans to increase
spending in rural areas during 2006 by US$5.3 billion, bringing total funding to
US$42.5 billion, to ease the lives of the estimated 750 million Chinese whose lives are
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mum living security system for rural residents and low-income
city residents.45 As a result, many view this administration as a
qinmin government, a government that cares for the ordinary
people.46 This reputation is partly attributable to this adminis-
tration's rural-worker-friendly policies.47
C. Current Conditions of Migrant Workers: Problems, Causes, and
Proposed Solutions
Despite the adoption of national and local policies aimed at
improving the conditions of rural workers, rural workers are still
subject to a variety of forms of labor abuse. The rest of Part I
discusses these problems.
1. Current Labor Conditions
Most migrant workers do not have an employment con-
tract" and thus do not have the benefits of labor law protec-
connected to agriculture."); see also Fan, supra note 42, 12 (quoting Kenneth G. Lie-
berthal, a former Clinton administration official and a professor of political science at
the University of Michigan, as saying that Chinese President Hu Jintao has devoted
more resources to rural China).
45. See The State Council Decides to Accelerate the Establishment of a New-Type Rural
Health Care System, JINGHuA SHIBAO [JINGHUA TIMES] (China), posted on XINLANG WANG
[SNANET], Aug. 11, 2005, 2, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-08-11/
01137464461.shtml (reporting that the State Council of China plans to expand the new
rural health care system to cover more rural areas); see also Urban-Rural Low Income Secur-
ity Provides a Safety Net for the Poor, PEOPLE's DAILY (China), Dec. 12, 2007, 9 10, available
at http://www.cass.net.cn/file/20071012102999.html (reporting that the year 2007 is
the tenth anniversary of China's building an urban minimum living security system and
that in 2007 China started to build a rural minimum living security system).
46. See GuanMing Wang [Brightness Net] (China), China's Reform Under Hu-Wen
System, posted on NEWS.IFENG.COM (China), Oct. 15, 2007, 2, http://news.ifeng.com/
special/i 6jie5nian/fxpl/200710/1015_2055_259272.shtml (asserting that China's cur-
rent administration favors the poor and the disadvantaged sectors); see also Liu Xiaobo,
Bad System and "Good Prime Minister," http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/new-
sid7260000/newsid7262900/7262968.stm (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (commenting on
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao's public image of favoring the
disadvantaged and the poor and asserting that that image is far from adequate to solve
China's problems).
47. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (documenting the tremendous
efforts taken by the government in the past few years to promote the interests of mi-
grant workers who constitute a significant part of China's under-class).
48. See Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC, Inspection Report on the Implementation of the Labor
Law (presented to the nineteenth meeting of the Standing Committee of NPC on Dec.
28, 2005) § 2, 1 2, available at http://www.lawbook.com.cn/fzdt/newshtml/22/200603
20232745.htm (P.R.C.) (acknowledging that fewer than twenty percent of medium and
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tion.49 They work long hours50 with low wages,5 which are sig-
nificantly less than what average urban workers earn.52 In addi-
small size enterprises signed labor contracts with their employees and that with respect
to mini-size enterprises or rural workers the situation is worse); see also Survey Report
Team of All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Survey Report on Protection of the Rights
and Interests of Migrant Workers, in PROJECT TEham OF THE RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE
COUNCIL, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG DIAOYAN BAOGAO [SURVEY AND RESEARCH REPORT
ON CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS] supra note 1, at 178, 182 (stating that a 2004 survey by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security ("MOLSS") showed that only 12.5% of migrant
workers had a written labor contract and many contracts were not properly executed);
Reporter's Beijing Survey: Less Than Ten Percent of Rural Workers Have Labor Contracts, 9,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2007-06/05/content_6199825.htm (last visited Feb.
3, 2009) (reporting that since its opening on September 8, 2005 and up to March 15,
2007, Beijing Legal Aid for Rural Workers handled 152 work injury cases, of which only
9.2% had written labor contracts); Brown, supra note 38, at 50-51 (citing that most
construction workers do not have formal labor contracts as the law requires).
49. SeeJi Shao, Rural Workers and the Issue of Rural Area, Agriculture and Peasants, in
ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RURAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS
IN CHINA: ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION] supra note 1, at 534, 537 (observing that lack
of labor contracts, as well as invalid contracts, often renders migrant workers' rights and
interests unprotected under labor laws); see also Judge Guo Wenlong, Labor Contract
Legislation should Avoid the Faults in the Legislation of the Labor Law, 12 ZHONGGUO
LAODONG [CHINA LABOR] (China) 14, 15 (2005) (criticizing that under Labor Law em-
ployers can deny the existence of a defacto employment relationship and refuse to pay
compensation to workers if the employment contract is invalid under Labor Law);
Huangli & Zheng, supra note 38, at 57 (recognizing signing labor contracts as a pre-
ventative measure for migrant workers to protect their rights and interest).
50. See Survey Report Team of MOLSS, Research Report on Rural Workers' Wages and
Problems of Labor Protection, in PROJECT TEAM OF THE RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE
COUNCIL, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG DIAOYAN BAOCAO [SURVEY AND RESEARCH REPORT
ON CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS] supra note 1, at 201, 203 (noting that a 2004 survey by
National Statistics Bureau indicated that migrant workers on average worked over sixty
hours a week); see also Qiao Qingmei, Migrant Workers and Work Injury Insurance, in
ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RuRAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS
IN CHINA: ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION] supra note 1, at 386, 393 (citing that in Zhuji-
ang Delta 46% of migrant workers worked twelve to fourteen hours a day and 47% did
not have a rest day).
51. See Tao Huaiying, Suggestions on Resolving the Wage Problems of Migrant Workers, in
PROJECT TEAmA OF THE RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, ZHONGGUO NONGM-
INGONG DiAOYAN BAOGAO [SURVEY AND RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS]
supra note 1, at 213, 213-14 (stating that a 2004 survey showed that migrant workers
earned 500-800 Yuan (approximately US$62-US$97 back then) per month); see also Le-
gal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the Standing Commit-
tee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 2, 2 (discussing the severe problem of low wages
faced by migrant workers).
52. See Tao, supra note 51, at 213-14 (noting that migrant workers in the provinces
of Hunan, Sichuang, and Henan earned less than sixty percent of urban workers' aver-
age wages, and that as migrant workers worked a lot more hours than urban workers,
the actual hourly wage of migrant workers was merely one quarter that of urban work-
ers); see also Chen Yiner, Migrant Workers and Employment Barriers, in ZHONGGUO NONGM-
INGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RuRAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA: ISSUES
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tion, migrant workers' wages do not increase much when the
economy develops at a fast pace.5' Today many migrant workers
are still subject to wage arrears54 even after the national and lo-
cal governments have made a series of efforts to solve the prob-
lem since 2004.55 Most migrant workers do not have health in-
surance and pensions.56 Many employers of migrant workers do
not provide safety instruments. 57 Consequently, migrant workers
constitute the vast majority of work injury victims.5" To make it
worse, most migrant workers do not have work injury insur-
AND SOCIAL PROTECTION] supra note 1, at 279, 281 (noting that migrant workers receive
lower wages even though they do the same work as workers with urban household regis-
tration status).
53. See Brown, supra note 38, at 48 (observing that China's impressive economic
growth in GNP for over a decade is not matched in the real wage growth of workers,
which roughly keeps pace with rates of inflation); see also Survey Report Team of
MOLSS, supra note 50, at 204 (stating that the Zhujiang Delta, which surrounds Hong
Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, had an annual Gross Domestic Production growth
rate of over 20% in a twelve-year period, while the average monthly wage of migrant
workers in that region saw virtually no increase in the same period).
54. See Tao, supra note 51, at 214 (affirming that a Beijing survey shows that in
2004 each of the 700,000 migrant construction workers in Beijing was on average sub-
ject to wage arrears in the amount of over 4000 Yuan, which equaled their wages of four
or five months); see also Luo Zhixian, Migrant Workers and Right to Social Security, in
ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RuRAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS
IN CHINA: ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROTECrION] supra note 1, at 315, 317 (recognizing wage
arrears as a pervasive and serious problem).
55. See Xie, supra note 35, at 680-82 (showing that from 2003 to 2006, the State
Council and the Ministries below issued thirteen Notices requiring a solution to the
problem of wage arrears); see also Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law
Committee of the Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 1, 4 (report-
ing that many local governments have taken measures to address the problem of wage
arrears).
56. See General Report Drafting Team, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that a survey by
MOLSS shows that only 10% of rural workers had health insurance and 15% had pen-
sion); see also Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 2, 4 (acknowledging that it is
difficult for most migrant workers to participate in social security and pension plans).
57. See Survey Report Team of MOLSS, supra note 50, at 205 (mentioning that in
the construction industry only 39% of employers provide labor safety instruments to
migrant workers); see also Qiao, supra note 50, at 396 (stating that many enterprises do
not observe legal requirements to provide labor safety equipments to workers).
58. See Survey Report Team of MOLSS, supra note 50, at 205 (stating that a survey
by the Trade Union of Guangdong province shows that more than 80% of work injury
victims in private enterprises are migrant workers); see also Survey Report Team of All-
China Federation of Trade Unions, supra note 48, at 182 (pointing out that the Na-
tional Safe Production Supervision General Bureau's incomplete statistics indicates that
every year nearly 700,000 workers are handicapped, the vast majority of them migrant
workers).
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ance.
59
2. Causes of the Problems and Proposed Solutions
Multiple factors are responsible for the prevalent violation
of the labor rights of migrant workers. Defects and loopholes in
the Labor Law make it difficult to provide full protection.6"
Where existing laws do provide protection, non-compliance by
employers, and sometimes even regional governments, remains
fairly common.6" At the same time, labor regulations often pro-
vide insufficient remedies for violations of labor rights and en-
forcement of labor regulations is notoriously weak.62
a. Remaining Discriminatory Policies and Regulations
Based on the household registration system, urban citizens
continue to enjoy social benefits and public services not offered
to migrant workers. 63 Many city governments and residents are
used to, and comfortable with the lesser treatment of rural work-
ers.64 There is no law prohibiting employment discrimination
59. See Huangli & Zheng , supra note 38, at 66 (noting that a 2005 survey of four
major cities shows that 29.1% of migrant workers had work injury insurance and among
the four cities the figure in Beijing was 13.1%); see also General Report Drafting Team,
supra note 1, at 13 (emphasizing that a national survey by Ministry of Agriculture re-
vealed that only 12.9% of migrant workers had work injury insurance in 2005).
60. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 126-36 (discussing the many inadequacies of
various labor regulations); see also Luo, supra note 54, at 318-19 (discussing the inade-
quacies of social security regulations with respect to migrant workers).
61. See Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 2 (summarizing the various ways
in which enterprises, and sometimes local governments, fail to comply with labor regu-
lations); see also Gu Yikang, Thoughts on Questions Regarding Migrant Workers, in PROJECT
TEAM OF THE RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG
DIAOYAN BAOCAO [SURVEY AND RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA'S RURAL WoRKERS] supra
note 1, at 493, 500 (criticizing some local officials for downplaying the protection of the
rights and interest of migrant labors).
62. See JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 126-38 (discussing the insufficiencies of
China's labor inspection and arbitration regulations and the weaknesses in the enforce-
ment of labor regulatons); see also Survey Report Team of MOLSS, supra note 50, at 206
(acknowledging labor security regulations fail to provide special protection for power-
less social groups such as migrant workers, that existing regulations do not provide
sufficient compensation for wage arrears and wage reductions, and that the enforce-
ment of labor regulations is unsatisfying).
63. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (indicating that city governments pro-
vide many social security benefits and public services exclusively to residents with urban
household registration status).
64. See Zheng & Huangli, supra note 1, at 20 (asserting that discriminations and
biases on the part of city governments and residents towards rural residents contribute,
2009] CHINA'S NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW 1097
based upon household registration status.6 5 Even the Labor Law
does not purport to include rural workers under its protection.66
Even though the Ministry of Labor6 7 in 1995 interpreted the La-
bor Law as applicable to migrant workers,6 8 government organs
and local governments were not prepared to extend equal treat-
ment to rural workers. 69 For example, even though Article 3 of
the Labor Law provides that laborers enjoy equal employment
rights, 70 national governments and regional governments have
to a large degree, to the unfair treatment of migrant workers); see also Survey Research
Team of MOLSS, supra note 50, at 205-06 (pointing out that some government employ-
ees and urban residents still believe that migrant workers should not enjoy equal rights
as urban workers).
65. See JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 126 (asserting that China lacks regulations
prohibiting discrimination on the ground of household registration status); see generally
XIAN FA (1982) (P.R.C.).
Even though Article 33 of the Constitution states that "[a]ll citizens of the People's
Republic of China are equal before the law," Article 33, along with some other articles
of the Constitution, such as articles on citizens' freedom of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of procession, of demonstration and of religious belief, are not
fully implemented, which is another example of the gap between the law on paper and
the law in practice in China. Id. art. 33.
66. See Yue, supra note 34, at 306 (contending that Labor Law does not explicitly
define migrant workers as laborers); see also Wen Qinghong, Study of The Labor Law and
Protection of Rural Workers' Rights and Interests: Comments on Relevant Provisions of Draft
Labor Contract Law, WUHAN DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUIXUE BAN) [JOURNAL Or Wt-
HAN UNIVERSITY (PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL SCIENCES)] 625 (2006) (observing that Labor
Law does not explicitly include migrant workers under its protection, but neither does
it exclude migrant workers). But see Cooney, supra note 2, at 1054 n.20.
67. The Ministry of Labor was renamed MOLSS, and was again renamed Ministry
of Human Resources and Social Security. See Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/mohrss/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
68. See Opinions on Several Questions Concerning the Implementation of The
Labor Law, Article 1, (issued by Ministry of Labor, Aug. 4, 1995, available at http://
www.cdldbz.gov.cn/PD0603020466/WD0603083197.asp (P.R.C.) (stating that Labor
Law shall apply to migrant workers).
69. See Zheng & Huangli, supra note 1, at 20 (pointing out that some government
regulations, especially local policies, continue to discriminate against migrant workers);
see also Luo, supra note 54, at 319-20 (asserting that China's social security regulations
were mainly aimed at workers with urban household status and there were almost no
corresponding regulations covering rural residents or migrant workers).
70. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 3.
Providing that:
Laborers shall have the right to be employed on an equal basis, choose occu-
pations, obtain remuneration for their labor, take rest, have holidays and
leaves, obtain protection of occupational safety and health, receive training in
vocational skills, enjoy social insurance and welfare, and submit applications
for settlement of labor disputes, and other rights relating to labor as stipulated
by law.
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since promulgated many regulations restricting the employment
of rural workers.71 Even the Regulations on Unemployment In-
surance promulgated by the State Council in 1999 has virtually
only urban workers in mind and provides merely marginal bene-
fits for migrant workers.7 2 Even as recently as 2006, the Ministry
of Labor and Social Security ("MOLSS") still felt the need to call
upon city governments to further reduce discriminatory regula-
tions on migrant workers.7 3
In light of inadequate legislative protection to migrant
71. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 40-43 (discussing national and local measures
adopted from 1993-99 aimed at restraining the migration and employment of rural
workers); see also General Report Team, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that some cities set
employment barriers against migrant workers).
72. See Shiye Baoxian Tiaoli [Regulations on Unemployment Insurance] (promul-
gated by State Council Order No. 258, Jan. 22, 1999, effective Jan. 22, 1999.), http://
www.henan.gov.cn/bsfw/system/2006/08/04/010000642.shtml (P.R.C.).
The Regulations on Unemployment Insurance have mainly urban workers in
mind, mentioning on-contract rural workers only twice (Article 6 and Article 21) and
ignoring the vast majority of migrant workers who do not have employment contracts.
Id. arts. 6, 21.
Article 6 provides that on-contract rural workers, unlike urban workers, not pay
unemployment insurance premium. Id. art. 6.
However, Article 14 makes paying unemployment insurance premium a prerequi-
site of receiving unemployment insurance benefits, effectively excluding even on-con-
tract rural workers from unemployment insurance coverage. Id. art. 14.
Article 21 requires social security agencies to pay a one-time stipend to on-contract
rural workers who lose their jobs after having worked continuously for more than one
year, and delegates the power to local governments to determine the method and the
amount of payment of the one-time stipend in contrast to the national standards of
unemployment insurance benefits for urban workers. Id. art. 21; see also JtANG ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 50 (commenting that, under the Regulations on Unemployment Insur-
ance, on-contract rural workers who lose their jobs after continuous employment for
more than one year can receive one-time stipends from social security agencies but are
not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits provided for urban workers).
73. See Opinions on Several Questions Concerning the Implementation of the
State Council's Notice to Further Strengthen Employment and Re-employment, § 23
(promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Jan. 20, 2006), http://
www.scld.gov.cn/html/dispnews.asp?id=140 (P.R.C.) (requiring that local governments
further clear various unreasonable administrative certifications, fees and discriminative
regulations targeting migrant workers, and repeal restrictions on migrant workers'
trans-regional employment); see also Interview with Li Tao, Director, Xiezuozhe
[Facilitators], in Beijing, China (July 31, 2007) (Li Tao stating that that migrant workers
in Beijing, unlike Beijing residents, were denied unemployment insurance payment
even though they had paid insurance premiums). Xiezuozhe is a Chinese Non Govern-
mental Organization providing volunteer services for migrant populations, with head-
quarters in Beijing and a branch in Nanjing. Xiezhuzhe engages in labor empower-
ment, community anti-poverty and policy advocacy activities. Since its foundation in
2003 Xiezuozhe has provided services to more than 100,000 migrant workers.
Xiezuozhe, http://www.facilitator.ngo.cn (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
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workers, some scholars proposed enacting a special law to pro-
vide focused and comprehensive protection to migrant work-
ers."4 Such legislation, they believe, is necessary to counter the
continuing and widespread discrimination against, and poor
treatment of, migrant workers.7 5 Others opposed this proposal,
believing that improved legislation can extend equal protection
to rural workers, dispensing with the need of an ad hoc law for
migrant workers.7 6 Furthermore, some worry that since labor
rights violations also happen to other laborers, special protec-
tion of migrant workers may create a new form of inequality.77
At the present time, the Chinese government does not seem to
be on track to making a specialized law for migrant workers.7"
b. Non-Compliance with Existing Laws and Regulations
Notwithstanding imperfections of Chinese labor legislation,
there are laws and regulations that extend a fair amount of pro-
tection to rural workers but these laws and regulations are not
74. SeeJiang et al., supra note 2, at 71, 168-70 (discussing arguments supporting
special legislation, such as a Migrant Workers Rights and Interests Protection Act); See
also Luo, supra note 54, at 321 (advocating the enactment of a Migrant Workers Social
Security Act).
75. See JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 71 (citing the argument that the Migrant
Workers Rights and Interests Protection Act is needed to legally establish migrant work-
ers' political status, their status as industrial workers and their rights to equal treatment
in all respects, and citing the suggestion that the government enhance the legislative
authority of laws on migrant workers and ascertain migrant workers' status under law);
see also Luo, supra note 54, at 321 (asserting the need to strengthen the legislation of
social security laws for migrant workers in order to resolve the problem that existing
social security laws on migrant workers leave some issues blank and are low in their
legislative authority).
76. See generally Liu Wujun, Protection of the Rights and Interests of Rual Wrkers Hinges
on the Implementation of the Labor Law, JIANCHA RBAO [PRocURATORIAL DAILY], Jan. 4,
2004, http://www.cnlsslaw.com/list.asp?unid=2602 (last visited Oct. 13, 2008) (arguing
that strict enforcement of Labor Law would provide sufficient protection for migrant
workers and a special law for migrant workers is a waste of legislative resources); see also
JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 71, 169-72 (citing a variety of arguments why an ad hoc law
for migrant workers is unnecessary and impractical and arguing that modifying existing
laws and strengthening enforcement suffice to protect migrant workers).
77. See Interview with Li Tao, supra note 73 (Li Tao raising this concern to the
author); see a/soJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 172 (expressing the same concern).
78. See Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 3, 7. The Law Committee of
the Standing Committee of NPC recommended enacting certain laws to protect the
rights and interests of laborers, which do not include a specialized law for migrant
workers; see, e.g., Luo, supra note 54, at 321 (acknowledging that the time may not be
right to enact a Migrant Workers Social Security Act).
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complied with.79 For example, since Article 16 of the Labor Law
mandates a labor contract at the formation of the employment
relationship, s" in theory, there should be no lack of employment
contracts. In addition, Article 36 of the Labor Law limits the
average weekly work week to forty-four hours,"1 Article 44 pro-
vides for overtime compensation, 2 and Article 50 prohibits wage
arrears and nonpayment.8 3
Chapter VI of the Labor Law, as well as the Safe Production
Law (P.R.C.), address work safety issues." Compliance with
these laws should, in theory, have eradicated many unsafe work
conditions. Article 72 of the Labor Law requires employers to
pay their share of social security premiums for the benefit of em-
ployees.8 5 Article 73 specifies that social security covers pension,
healthcare, work injury or occupational illness compensation,
unemployment compensation, and reproduction benefits.8 6
79. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing China's labor regula-
tions that would have provided a fair amount of protection for migrant workers).
80. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 16 (requiring that "[a] labor contract shall be
concluded where a labor relationship is to be established.").
81. Id. art. 36 (commanding that "[t]he State shall practice a working hour system
under which laborers shall work for no more than eight hours a day and no more than
forty-four hours a week on the average.").
82. Id. art. 44.
Providing that:
The employing unit shall, according to the following standards, pay laborers
remunerations higher than those for normal working hours under any of the
following circumstances: (1) to pay no less than 150% of the normal wages if
the extension of working hours is arranged; (2) to pay no less than 200% of
the normal wages if the extended hours are arranged on days of rest and no
deferred rest can be taken; and (3) to pay no less than 300% of the normal
wages if the extended hours are arranged on statutory holidays.
Id.
83. Id. art. 50 (providing that "[w]ages shall be paid monthly to laborers them-
selves in cash. The wages paid to laborers shall not be deducted or delayed without
justification.").
84. Id. ch. VI (entitled "Occupational Safety and Health"); see also Safe Production
Law (enacted by NPC, June 29, 2002, effective Nov. 1, 2002), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/legal/2003-01/22/content 701861.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2008) (P.R.C.) (Sec-
tion 2 regulates the conduct of production units, Section 3 provides for rights and obli-
gations of employees in production units, Section 4 provides for supervision and inspec-
tion of safe production by government bodies, Section 5 deals with emergency rescue
and accident investigation, and Section 6 imposes legal liabilities on various parties,
including government employees and officials).
85. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 72 (requiring that "[t]he employing unit and
laborers must participate in social insurance and pay social insurance premiums in ac-
cordance with the law.").
86. Id. art. 73 (stating that "[1]aborers shall, in accordance with the law, enjoy so-
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Furthermore, the Regulations on Work Injury Insurance,
promulgated by the State Council in 2003, mandate that employ-
ers pay work injury insurance premiums for all employees in-
cluding rural workers.8"
Commentators believe that had these laws and regulations
been complied with, almost all the problems affecting migrant
workers would have been solved.88 However, it is no secret that
China needs to not only make new laws to fill in gaps in legisla-
tion but also to deal with the problem of widespread noncompli-
ance with existing laws.89
c. Poor Labor Supervision and Enforcement
Non-compliance with existing laws and regulations on labor
are coupled with a lack of supervision and enforcement on the
part of the State.9" Though the State Council passed the Regula-
tions on Labor Security Inspection in 2004,"t this regulation is
cial insurance benefits under the following circumstances: (1) retirement; (2) illness or
injury; (3) disability caused by work-related injury or occupational disease; (4) unem-
ployment; and (5) child-bearing.").
87. Regulations on Work Injury Insurance (promulgated by the State Council,
Apr. 16, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004), http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/
showl.php?fileid=84996 (last visited Oct. 13, 2008) (P.R.C.) (Article 61 stresses that
this Regulation covers all laborers regardless of the form and term of the employment,
including laborers in a de facto labor relationship with an employer).
88. See Liu, supra note 76, 4 (arguing that strict enforcement of the Labor Law
would provide sufficient protection for migrant workers and a special law for migrant
workers is a waste of legislative resources); see a/soJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 71, 169-
72 (citing a variety of arguments that strengthening enforcement of existing laws suf-
fices to protect migrant workers).
89. See The Development of Contemporary Chinese Legislation, CHINA.ORG, Sept. 28,
2003, Sec. A. New Turning Point, 15, http://www.china.org.cn/english/kuaixun/
76336.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (describing the stages in the development of
China's contemporary legislation and stating that in the twenty-year period prior to
2003 China enacted about 400 laws); See also Cooney, supra note 2, at 1052 (noting that
deficient implementation of, and compliance with, labor law (and law in general) is
universal in China); GREGORY C. CHOW, CHiNA's ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 188
(2007) (stating that many laws in China are poorly enforced and that the main reasons
are a lack of a modern legal enforcement system, the lax attitude of the Chinese people
towards such laws, and the economic costs of obeying them).
90. See Cooney, supra note 2, at 1060-76 (examining the shortcomings of the insti-
tutions charged with securing compliance with labor regulations); see also Legal En-
forcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the Standing Committee of
NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 2, 6 (acknowledging weakness in the supervision and
enforcement of Labor Law as a serious problem).
91. See Regulations on Labor Security Inspection (promulgated by the State Coun-
cil, Oct. 26, 2004, effective Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/
showl.php?fileid=97457 (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (P.R.C.).
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poorly implemented, partly because labor supervision bureaus
are not adequately funded and staffed. 92 For example, there
were 17,000 labor supervision agents in China in 2006 with each
of them having, on average, a workload of overseeing 1600 en-
terprises for the protection of the labor rights of 17,000 work-
ers. 93  In another example, the Baoan District of Shenzhen,
which had over 22,500 enterprises and three million migrant
workers and should have over 300 labor security supervisors per
the Regulations on Labor Security Inspection, had merely fifteen
labor supervisors.9 4
Another problem is that regional governments play a criti-
cal role in the implementation and enforcement of labor stan-
dards in that labor supervision bureaus rely on local govern-
ments for personnel and funding.95 Some regional governments
deliberately ignore labor right violations to lure investors.96
Some regional governments even intervened with labor supervi-
sion in an effort to create an investment-friendly environment.
9 7
92. See Cooney, supra note 2, at 1066 (noting that the quantity of labor inspectors
may well be inadequate to implement the law systematically across the country); See also
Survey Report Team of MOLSS, supra note 50, at 206-07 (acknowledging that across
China, labor supervision and inspection agencies at municipality levels are short of staff
and funds).
93. See General Report Drafting Team, supra note 1, at 16.
94. See id.
95. See Cooney, supra note 2, at 1066 (noting that local governments provide staff
and funding to local labor departments); see also Survey Report Team of MOLSS, supra
note 50, at 206-07 (acknowledging that the local labor supervision and inspection forces
are limited by the institutional organization of municipalities).
96. See China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, supra note 6, 1 11 (quoting the
Deputy Chairwoman of the Law Committee of the Legislature's Standing Committee
that local governments have great tolerance for foreign investors in order to attract and
retain investment, and that officials are hesitant to say no to investors even if investors
violate the Labor Law); see also Lao Li, New Labor Contract Law Provides Challenge in
China, CHINA DAILY, July 23, 2007, 6, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-
07/23/content_6001380.htm (stating that some regional governments openly aban-
doned law enforcement and trampled on workers' rights to lure investors); Legal En-
forcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the Standing Committee of
NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 2, 7 (acknowledging that some local governments
sacrifice the rights and interests of laborers to attract business and investment).
97. SeeJiANc ET AL., supra note 2, at 159 (noting that a few local governments in
Guangdong province denied Labor Supervision Bureaus entry into to enterprises ab-
sent approval from Investment Inducement Bureaus); see also Legal Enforcement and
Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.),
supra note 48, § 2, 7 (reporting that some regional governments set barriers to the
enforcement of labor security laws, proscribing labor enforcement in key local enter-
prises and subjecting the imposition of administrative labor violation penalties to the
sanction of economic bureaus).
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What is more, labor supervision personnel often do not respond
to labor abuse reports and claims promptly and adequately.98
d. Inadequate Legal Remedy
Remedies under the Labor Law often prove inefficient and
insufficient. Article 79 of the Labor Law provides that an em-
ployee may first seek labor dispute resolution through the Labor
Dispute Mediation Committee in the employer's enterprise.99
However, most enterprises do not have a Labor Dispute Media-
tion Committee because its establishment is not mandatory
under the Labor Law.' 0 Article 83 effectively requires that a la-
borer seek arbitration before seeking a judicial remedy,1 ' while
Article 82 sets a statute of limitations for applying for arbitration
of merely sixty days after the cause of action arises. 10 2 People
criticize the sixty-day statute of limitations as being too harsh on
98. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 117 (stating that some regional labor supervi-
sion and inspection agencies tolerate labor violations and do not take laborers' com-
plaints seriously); Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of
the Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 2, 6-7 (reporting that
some labor supervision and inspection agencies fail to timely address labor disputes and
some law enforcement personnel show indifference to laborers).
99. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 79 (stating that "[w]here a labor dispute takes
place, the parties involved may apply to the labor dispute mediation committee of their
unit for mediation."). With respect to the labor dispute mediation committee, Article
80 provides that "[t]he committee shall be composed of representatives of the staff and
workers, representatives of the employing unit, and representatives of the trade union.
The chairman of the committee shall be held by a representative of the trade union.
Agreements reached on labor disputes through mediation shall be implemented by the
parties involved." Id. art. 80.
100. Labor Law Article 80 merely states that "[a] labor dispute mediation commit-
tee may be established inside the employing unit." Id. Therefore, the establishment of
a labor dispute mediation committee within an enterprise is not required. Id.
101. Labor Law Article 83 states that "[w]here a party involved in a labor dispute is
not satisfied with the adjudication, the party may bring a lawsuit to a people's court
within fifteen days from the date of receiving the ruling of arbitration." Id. art. 83; see
also JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 146 (commenting that in China parties to a labor
dispute must first apply for arbitration and can litigate their dispute only if not satisfied
with the arbitration decision); Jill E. Monnin, Extending the Reach of the Chinese Labor
Law: How Does the Supreme People's Court's 2006 Interpretation Transform Labor Dispute Reso-
lution?, 16 PAC. RiM L. & PoL'vJ. 753, 757 (2007) (explaining that according to Article
[83] of the Labor Law, a dispute can only come before the People's Courts if one of the
parties does not accept the arbitral award, rendering arbitration a prerequisite to litiga-
tion).
102. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 82 (stating that "[t]he party that requests for
arbitration shall file a written application to a labor dispute arbitration committee
within sixty days starting from the date of the occurrence of a labor dispute.").
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workers.10 3
According to Article 83, both the employee and the em-
ployer are entitled to appeal an arbitral award to local courts
(and higher courts as well). °4 As a consequence, it would nor-
mally take more than one year for a labor claimant to go
through all the procedures to obtain a final award.'0 5 Given the
financial hardships experienced by most migrant workers, espe-
cially in wage arrear and work injury cases, it is hard for them to
sustain themselves economically during the long waiting pe-
riod.10 6 In response, some scholars have proposed that labor dis-
pute arbitration be optional instead of mandatory.10 7
In this regard, China enacted the Law on Mediation and
Arbitration of Labor Disputes on December 29, 2007, effective
on May 1, 2008.0 s This law addresses, inter alia, the problems
103. See Survey and Research Team of Ministry of Law, in PROJECT TEAM OF THE
RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, ZHONGGUIO NONGMINGONG DIAOYAN BAOGAO
[SJRVEY AND RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA'S RURAL WORKERS] supra note 1, at 190, 195,
198 (advocating extending the sixty-day period to six months because the sixty-day pe-
riod is too short and many migrant workers do not understand its critical significance
while some employing units beat this statutory period by pretending to engage in a
negotiated solution with the laborer); see also DONG LIHUA, SHI FuMAO & WANG FANG,
EDS., SHUi DONGLE TAMEN DE QUANLI?-ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WEIQUAN ANLI
JINGXI [WHO INFRINGED THEIR RIGHTS?-CLOSE ANALYSIS OF RIGHT VINDICATING CASES
OF CHINA'S MIGRANT WORKERS] 44 (2006) (pointing out that in reality migrant workers
often cannot meet the sixty-day statute of limitations and as a result their arbitration
claims are dismissed by the Labor Dispute Arbitration Committee).
104. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 83 (providing that "[w]here a party involved in
a labor dispute is not satisfied with the adjudication, the party may bring a lawsuit to a
people's court within fifteen days from the date of receiving the ruling of arbitration.");
see also Monnin, supra note 101, at 758 (noting that appeals from an arbitral award can
be made to a civil court within fifteen days after the award is received).
105. See Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 2, 1 6 (reporting that it would
take at least one year to complete the arbitration and litigation procedures); see also
JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 209 (citing that the resolution of a labor dispute normally
takes more than one year to go through one arbitration and two judicial trials).
106. See Survey and Research Team of Ministry of Law, supra note 103, at 195
(commenting that the extended arbitration and litigation period works a great disad-
vantage to migrant workers); see also JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 209-10 (stating that
the extended arbitration and litigation period places a huge economic burden upon
grievant migrant workers).
107. See Survey and Research Team of Ministry of Law, supra note 103, at 198 (ad-
vocating amending the Labor Law to allow parties to a labor dispute to go straight into
litigation); see also JIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 210 (contending for repeal of the re-
quirement of mandatory arbitration of a labor dispute).
108. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa
[Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes of the People's Republic of
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discussed here in an effort to provide aggrieved laborers with
expedient and adequate legal remedies. 10 9
II. THE LABOR CONTRACT LAW
China's enactment of its first Labor Contract Law in June
2007 is a major move toward regulating labor relations and pro-
tecting workers."' People view the Labor Law as providing only
China], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2007,
effective May 1, 2008), http://www.lexiscn.com/specialTopic/laborContractLaw/de-
tail.php?se=glaw&id=229935&provider id=l&isEnglish=Y (last visited Oct. 18, 2008)
(P.R.C.); see also Xinhua News, Official Underlines Breakthroughs in New Disputes Arbitration
Law, Jan. 2, 2008, 2, posted on China Radio International, http://english.cri.cn/
2946/2008/01/02/198@310054.htm (reporting that the Law on Mediation and Arbi-
tration of Labor Disputes aims at "fair and timely" settlement of labor disputes and
lowers costs for workers Seeking to safeguard their rights).
109. See generally FengJianhua, Workforce Watches Labor Law, Sept. 26, 2007, BEIJING
REVIEW, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2007-09/26/content_77750.htm (dis-
cussing the legislative background of China's new labor dispute mediation and arbitra-
tion law, commenting on some of the labor issues discussed in this Comment and esti-
mating that the law could lead to better protection of worker's interests); see also
Jonathan Selvadoray, China: New Chinese Labour Arbitration Law, http://
www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=60530 (last visisted Feb. 3, 2009) (summarizing
the law in eight sections: "Pre-Requisite Arbitration And Voluntary Mediation," "Condi-
tionally Final And Binding Arbitral Awards," "Extended Scope Of Arbitrable Matters,"
"Extended Arbitration Application Period," "Clearer Jurisdiction Of Labour Arbitration
Committee," "Shorter Hearing And Award-Making Period," "Heavier Burden Of Proof
On Employers," and "No Charge Of Arbitration Fees," and concluding that the new
labor dispute mediation and arbitration law represents a shift towards the protection of
employees); Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 108.
Article 27 of the Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes extends the
statute of limitations for workers to apply for labor arbitration from sixty days to one
year. Id. art. 27.
Article 43 requires the arbitral tribunal to make an award, if any, within forty-five
days and if no arbitral award is made after the time limit, the parties may initiate litiga-
tion in relation to the labor dispute to the people's court. Id. art. 43.
Article 43 also provides that "[w]here the arbitral tribunal makes an award to a
labor dispute case and partial facts are clear, an award may be made on such parts." Id.
Article 44 provides that in respect of cases for the claim of labor remunerations,
work injury medical expenses, economic compensation, or damages, the arbitral tribu-
nal may make an award on advance execution and transfer to the people's court for
execution if: (1) there is a clear relation of rights and obligations between the parties
and (2) there is no advance execution, the living of the applicant will be seriously af-
fected. Furthermore, where a laborer applies for advance execution, no security may
be required. Id. art. 44.
Article 47 makes arbitral awards final in certain disputes over labor remunerations,
work-related injury medical expenses, economic compensation or damages, thus spar-
ing workers the long waiting period in obtaining a final order. Id. art. 47.
Article 53 waives arbitration fees, in light of laborers' limited means. Id. art. 53.
110. See China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, supra note 6, 1-2 (reporting
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basic labor principles and lacking operable specifications."'
Scholars view the Labor Contract Law as necessary to give full
effect to the Labor Law's general provisions. 1 2 For the same
reason, scholars also called for the enactment of other labor-re-
lated laws, such as the Employment Promotion Law, the Safe
Production Law, the Wage Law, the Social Security Law, and the
Labor Supervision and Inspection Law." 3
A. Legislative Background
The Labor Law, enacted in 1994, has proven inadequate to
deal with problems arising out of the ever-more complicated la-
bor practices in China's fast-changing society. 14 The Labor
Contract Law purports to draw upon China's twenty-year-plus ex-
perience with labor contract practices and sets out to respond to
some of the manifest deficiencies of the Labor Law. 15 The
that the labor contract law represents the biggest change in Chinese labor law in more
than a decade and is meant to improve workers' rights); see also Xinhua News Agency,
China Issues Regulation to Clear Labor Contract Law Misunderstanding, BEIJIN-
GREVIEW.CN.COM, Sept. 19, 2008, 2, available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/head-
line/txt/2008-09/19/content_152939.htm (stating that Labor Contract Law was hailed
as a landmark step in protecting employee's rights); Morris, supra note 8, 1 7 (report-
ing that experts within China and labor groups abroad call Labor Contract Law the
most significant labor law since China was first introduced to market forces in the
1980s).
111. See Guan Huai, Labor Contract Law and Protection of Laborer's Legal Rights and
Interests, 5 LAw SCIENCE MAGAZINE 6 (2006) (stating that Labor Law, as a general law,
cannot provide detailed regulations and needs to be supplemented by more operable
labor laws and citing Ministry of Labor's Opinion on the Implementation of Labor Law
that the fundamental principles of Labor Law need to be carried out by supplementary
labor laws and regulations).
112. See id. (recognizing Labor Contract Law as a key component of China's to-be-
built labor law system); see also Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law
Committee of the Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 3, subsec. 7
(calling for the enactment of Labor Contract Law).
113. See Guan, supra note 111, at 6 (citing Ministry of Labor's Opinion that supple-
mentary labor laws are needed to complete the labor law system); see also Legal Enforce-
ment and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the Standing Committee of NPC
(P.R.C.), supra note 48, § 3, subsec. 7 (recommending the enactment of supplementary
labor laws).
114. See Brown, supra note 38, at 47-48 (noting that to understand the nuances of
current labor relations in China, one must put it into the context of China's fast-moving
economic conditions); see also Guan, supra note 111, at 7 (affirming that since the en-
actment of Labor Law in 1994, labor relations in China have undergone enormous
changes and become diverse and complex, resulting in the Labor Law falling behind
social reality).
115. See Li Jianfei, Legislative Background and Innovations of Labor Contract Law, 4
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drafting and enactment of the Labor Contract Law received un-
precedented public participation." 6 After the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress ("NPC") announced
that it was seeking public comments on the Second Draft Labor
Contract Law, it received more than 190,000 comments within a
month, sixty percent of which came from common workers.1 17
The first thing notable about the Labor Contract Law is that
it openly and unmistakenly emphasizes the protection of the
rights of laborers."1 ' Article 1 states that the legislative purpose
of this law is to improve the labor contract system, define and
clarify the rights and obligations of parties to a labor contract,
protect the legitimate rights and interests of laborers, and build
and develop stable and harmonious labor relations. 1 9 At the
draft stage, there was a heated debate over what was called "Sin-
gle Protection" and "Dual Protection. '' 12° Supporters of "Dual
SCHOOL OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES] 72, 73 (2006), available at http://
www.fatianxia.com/paper list.asp?id=26178 (indicating that Labor Contract Law is to
address new forms of labor relationship and improve upon Labor Law); see also Guan,
supra note 111, at 8 (explaining that Labor Contract Law targets a series of problems
arising out of the implementation of Labor Law with respect to labor contracts).
116. See Yixiu, Draft Labour Contract Law Favors Employees' Rights, CHINA RADIO IN-
TERNATIONAL, 5, http://english.cri.cn/3178/2006/12/27/191@178076.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2009) (reporting that draft Labor Contract Law received more than 190,000
comments from the general public); see also China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law,
supra note 6, 1 6 (reporting that draft Labor Law got more than 190,000 responses
from the public and companies).
117. See Yixiu, supra note 116, 5 (stating that 60% of the more than 190,000
comments come from common employees).
118. See Lao, supra note 96 (stating that the main characteristic of Labor Contract
Law is that it puts special emphasis on protecting workers' legitimate rights and inter-
ests); see also Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 1 (stating that "[t]his Law has been
formulated in order to improve the employment contract system, to specify the rights
and obligations of the parties to employment contracts, to protect the lawful rights and
interests of workers and to build and develop harmonious and stable employment rela-
tionships.").
119. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 1.
120. See generally Institute of Economics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
Viewpoint Debates Engendered By The New Law, JINGJI ZOUSHi GENZONG [THE PURSUIT OF
ECONOMIC TRENDS] (2007), http://ie.cass.cn/window/T*zs.asp?id=510 (last visited Feb.
3, 2009) (reporting on the debates over "Single Protection" and "Dual Protection" and
indicating that "Single Protection" means focusing on the protection of laborers while
"Dual Protection" means protecting employees and employers equally); see also Wang
Quanxing, Several Fundamental Questions That Need Clarification in the Labor Contract Law
Legislation Debate, 9 FA XUE [LAw SCIENCE] (China) 19, 19-20 (2006) (arguing for "Single
Protection" while pointing out that "Single Protection" does not mean not to protect
the interests of employers at all, that "Single Protection" only means stressing or lean-
ing towards the protection of laborers); Zhang Weijie, Labor Contract Law's Emphasis on
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Protection" argued that the Labor Contact Law should not par-
tially protect laborers' rights, but should provide equal protec-
tion to the rights and interests of employers as well. 12 1 On the
other hand, supporters of "Single Protection" contended that
China's enormous laborer surplus places workers in a de facto
inferior bargaining position in relation to employers, which is
the underlying cause of widespread labor abuses. 122 Factual ine-
quality between labor and capital, they argue, justifies an uneven
or "single protection" of laborers. 123 Article 1 of the Labor Con-
tract Law reflects this view.
124
It is worth noting that the American Chamber of Commerce
in China, the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai,
the Protection of Laborers is to Correct Inequality, GONGREN RiBAO [WORKERS DAILY] (China),
posted on People.com.cn, May 21, 2007, 2, 4, 10-11 http://acftu.people.com.cn/
GB/67588/5755004.html (citing law professor Lin Jia's discussion of "Single Protec-
tion" and "Dual Protection"). The debate over "Single Protection" and "Dual Protec-
tion" is related to the question of whether the Labor Contract Law should be treated as
a labor law or contract law. If deemed a contract law, the Labor Contract Law shall
provide equal protections to parties to a labor contract. On the other hand, if viewed as
a labor law, the Labor Contract Law shall serve a public policy of protecting the weak
party, namely the employees. Id.
121. See Institute of Economics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, supra note
120 (citing arguments against "Single Protection" that over-protections of workers may
render employers vulnerable to powerful employees such as senior managers and tech-
nicians and that favoring laborers may cause China lose its competitive advantage of low
labor costs); Judge Guo, supra note 49, at 15 (contending that some enterprises need
protection against senior managers and that Labor Law and Labor Contract Law should
exclude senior managers from labor protection); Wang, supra note 120, at 20-22 (citing
arguments against "Single Protection").
122. See Guan, supra note 111, at 7 (stating that due to a huge labor surplus and
the resulting difficulty of finding employment, laborers in reality are not equals to em-
ployers, as indicated by frequent infringements of labor rights); see also Monnin, supra
note 101, at 756 (observing that millions of migrant workers inundated coastal regions
and cities, thereby creating a "buyer's market for labor" and giving employers an oppor-
tunity to take advantage of abundant work forces); Wang, supra note 120, at 22 (assert-
ing that in China the fact that capital is powerful and laborers are weak will last for a
long period of time).
123. See Chang Kai, On Several Fundamental Issues In Labor Contract Law Legislation, 6
DANGDAI FAXUE [CONTEMPORARY LAw SCIENCE] (China) 31, 31-34 (contending that, on
the ground of public policy and the inequality between employers and employees, La-
bor Contract Law should follow the principles of labor law to stress protection of labor-
ers, rather than following the principles of contract law to provide even protection to
parties to a contract); see also Guan, supra note 111, at 7 (explaining "Single Protec-
tion"); Wang, supra note 120, at 19-22 (defending "Single Protection"); Zhang, supra
note 120, 7-12 (citing justifications for Labor Contract Law's emphasis on the pro-
tection of employees).
124. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. Article 1 of Labor Contract
Law stresses the protection of workers.
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and the Eurpean Union Chamber of Commerce in China also
submitted comments on the Second Draft Labor Contract Law
to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
("NPC") upon invitation.125 These foreign bodies opposed cer-
tain provisions in the draft law as too "harsh" on employers, cau-
tioning that those provisions would make it hard for foreign
businesses to do business in China, and may lead to the negative
effect of diverting foreign investment to other developing coun-
tries. 126 As a result, some labor rights groups in the West blamed
multinational corporations for lobbying to block China's effort
to improve labor standards. 127 Major U.S. trade unions also vis-
ited China to show their support of the draft Labor Contract
Law. 12' Nevertheless, the Standing Committee of the NPC did
125. See American Chamber of Commerce in China and American Chamber of
Commerce in Shanghai, Comments on the Second Deliberated Draft Labor Contract
Law of the PRC, http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global labor-strategies/files/2nd_
roundamchamcomments.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (presenting comments and
suggestions on many provisions of the second draft Labor Contract Law); see also Guan
Xiaofeng & Andrew London, Labor Law: 'No Giving in to Corporate Pressure,' CHINA
DAILY, June 12, 2007, 13 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/12/con-
tent_891903.htm (reporting that both the European Union Chamber of Commerce in
China and the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai made submissions to the
National People's Congress, China's legislature, on the proposed Labor Contract Law).
126. See Guan & London, supra note 125, 16 (reporting that in a letter to the
NPC last year, Serge Janssens de Varebeke-then-president of the European Union
Chamber of Commerce-warned the "strict" regulations could force foreign companies
to "reconsider new investments or continuing their activities in China" because of a
possible increase in production costs); see also China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law,
supra note 6, 1 7 (reporting that foreign business groups expressed alarm at some por-
tions of the draft Labor Contract Law, arguing that overly restrictive rules could raise
costs and hurt business); Associated Press, China Due To Enact New Labor Law After Heated
Debate, INT'L HERALD TIuB.,June 27, 2007, 12, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/
06/27/business/AS-FEA-FIN-China-Labor-Clash.php (reporting that foreign business
groups expressed alarm at proposed restrictions on firing workers, limits on use of tem-
porary workers, and a provision giving the All-China Federation of Trade Unions-the
umbrella group for unions permitted by the communist government-a voice in staff-
ing decisions); id. 1 13 (reporting that the U.S.-China Business Council warned that
restrictions on temporary employees would be "prohibitively expensive").
127. See Foreign Policy In Focus, Labor Rights in China, http://www.fpif.org/
fpiftxt/3824 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (telling a background story of the criticisms on
multinational corporations for opposing provisions in China's draft Labor Contract
Law); see also China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, supra note 6 (reporting that
labor activists criticized foreign business groups that expressed concern about earlier
versions of the law, accusing them of trying to get Beijing to reduce protections for
workers).
128. See China Labor News Translations, Mainland Coverage of A Recent Union
Visit to China: "Harmony", "Dialogue" and "Cooperation," http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/
ACFTU/250907.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (reporting on the May 2007 visit to
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take into consideration some of the comments of multinational
corporations and loosened the draft Labor Contract Law's re-
strictions on employers' power to lay off workers and set work-
place rules.
129
B. Labor Contract Law Responds to Insufficiencies in the Labor Law
and Labor Abuses
The Labor Contract Law addresses issues left open by the
Labor Law and deals with well-known abusive labor practices13 °
Notably, the Labor Contract Law addresses problems such as the
non-use of labor contracts, short contract terms, probation peri-
ods, wage arrears and nonpayment of wages, compensation
upon contract termination, and labor dispatch. 13
1
1. Employers' Obligation to Sign Labor Contracts
Article 16 of the Labor Law provides that the formation of
an employment relationship requires a written labor contract.
132
Even so, many employers do not sign written labor contracts with
their employees.1 3' Absent a written labor contract, when labor
China of a high level delegation from Change to Win (including Teamsters, UNITE
HERE, UFW, and SEIU)); see also Mitchell Landsberg, LABOR-L.A. Delegation Seeks
Brotherhood In China, L.A. TiMES, July 4, 2007, at c-i, 4-12, available at http://articles.
latimes.com/2007/jul/04/business/fi-chilabor4 (reporting on U.S. unions' recent and
planned visits to China).
129. See China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, supra note 6 (noting that, after
foreign business groups expressed alarm at a provision requiring approval from China's
state-sanctioned unions for layoffs, arguing that overly restrictive rules could raise costs
and hurt business, the legislature on the approved law made no mention of requiring
union approval for layoffs); see also China Due To Enact New Labor Law After Heated Debate,
supra note 126, 16 (reporting that comments from foreign business groups appear to
have prompted Beijing to remove the most contentious provisions in the draft Labor
Contract Law and the third draft of the law no longer requires approval from the offi-
cial labor body to fire workers).
130. See China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, supra note 6, 1 (reporting that
the newly enacted Labor Contract Law is meant to improve workers' rights amid com-
plaints about unpaid wages and other abuses); see also supra note 115 and accompany-
ing text (pointing out that Labor Contract Law deals with labor problems that Labor
Law fails to address).
131. This Comment will discuss Labor Contract Law's initiatives in handling these
problems infra.
132. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 16 (providing that "[a] labor contract is the
agreement reached between a laborer and an employing unit for the establishment of
the labor relationship and the definition of the rights, interests and obligations of each
party. A labor contract shall be concluded where a labor relationship is to be estab-
lished.").
133. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (acknowledging that many employ-
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disputes arise it is often difficult for the worker to prove an em-
ployment relationship with the employer.1"4 Failure to prove a
factual employment relationship in turn deprives the worker of
labor law remedies. 135 The last paragraph of Article 14 of the
Labor Contract Law attempts to close this loophole by stating
that if the employer does not sign a written labor contract within
one year after employment begins, the employer is deemed to
have signed an open-ended labor contract with the employee. 3 6
Multiple considerations lead employers to evade written la-
bor contracts. In absence of a written labor contract, the em-
ployer is able to impose harsh conditions on the worker after
employment starts and can terminate employment at any time
for whatever reason without any legal consequences. 37 In addi-
tion, since the Labor Law requires employers to pay social secur-
ity premiums for their employees, in an effort to lower costs,
some employers try to hide or lower the number of employees
on record by not making written labor contracts as labor con-
tracts may reveal the number of employees.1 38 At the same time,
the Labor Law fails to provide sufficient deterrence to employers
ers do not sign an employment contract with migrant workers); see also Morris, supra
note 8, 1 9 (stating that companies are notorious for not providing written contracts).
134. See Survey and Research Team of Ministry of Law, supra note 103, at 195-96
(recognizing that migrant workers are often unable to produce evidence of factual em-
ployment relationship with the employer and that co-workers are afraid to testify for the
grieved migrant worker for fear of the employer's retaliation); see also supra note 49 and
accompanying text (observing that that lack of labor contracts, as well as invalid con-
tracts, result in migrant workers' rights and interests being unprotected under labor
laws).
135. See Survey and Research Team of Ministry of Law, supra note 103, at 195-96
(pointing out that migrant workers' lack of an employment contract and inability to
prove a factual employment relationship with the employer often bars legal remedies).
136. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 14 (providing, in the last paragraph,
that "[i]f an Employer fails to conclude a written employment contract with a worker
within one year from the date on which it starts using the worker, the Employer and the
worker shall be deemed to have concluded an open-ended employment contract.").
137. See China Legal Information Resource Net, Light Analysis Of The Legal Issues
In The Protection Of Migrant Workers' Labor Rights And Interests, § 1, subsec.
2(2) (5), http://www.mzfz.gov.cn/fzjy/57/135/2007071322532.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2009) (noting that without being bound by an employment contract, some employing
units subject workers to all kinds of unreasonable treatments).
138. See Administrative Law Office of the Law Committee of the Standing Commit-
tee of NPC (P.R.C.), Implementation of Labor Contract System and Problems that
Need Be Solved by Labor Contract Law, § 2, subsec. 1, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/
2006-03/20/content_347912.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (P.R.C.) (pointing out that
some employing units, to reduce the cost of employment, choose not to execute em-
ployment contracts so as to evade the legal obligation of paying social insurance pre-
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who do not make labor contracts.1 3 9 Article 98 states merely that
labor administration bureaus shall order a noncompliant em-
ployer to make up labor contracts, but fails to provide any pen-
alty if the employer ignores the administrative order.14 ° Nor
does the Labor Law impose any punitive damages on employers
who wantonly refuse to sign employment contracts.1
4 1
In response, Article 82 of the Labor Contract Law imposes
upon employers, as opposed to employees, the obligation to
make written labor contracts and provides for penalties for non-
compliance. 14 2 This allocation of obligation is justified by the
fact that it is frequently the employer who seeks to avoid labor
contracts and that workers, especially rural workers, often are
afraid to ask for a contract because of their inferior bargaining
position. 143
mium and the obligation of paying layoff costs); see also Interview with Li Tao, supra
note 73 (Li Tao expressing this view during the interview).
139. See Administrative Law Office of the Law Committee of the Standing Commit-
tee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 18, § 2, subsec. I (noting that existing laws, including
Labor Law, fail to provide adequate penalty for not executing employment contracts);
see alsoJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 182 (stating that Labor Law fails to regulate employ-
ing units who delay or refuse to sign a labor contract with employees).
140. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 98 (providing that "[t]he employing unit that
revokes labor contracts or purposely delays the conclusion of labor contracts in viola-
tion of the conditions specified in this Law shall be ordered by the labor administrative
department to make corrections and shall bear the responsibility for compensation if
damages have been caused to laborers.").
141. Labor Law, supra note 30, arts. 89-105 ("Ch. XII Legal Responsibility."); see
alsoJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 127 (affirming that Labor Law demands too little from
employing units who deliberately decline to execute employment contracts, requiring
them only to compensate employees for losses).
142. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 82.
Providing that:
If an Employer concludes a written employment contract with a worker more
than one month but less than one year after the date on which it started using
him, it shall each month pay to the worker twice his wage.
If an Employer fails, in violation of this Law, to conclude an open-ended em-
ployment contract with a worker, it shall each month pay to the worker twice
his wage, starting from the date on which an open-ended employment con-
tract should have been concluded.
Id.
143. SeeJIANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 127 (complaining that because of the ine-
quality between employers and employees with respect to power, information, and re-
sources, employees are subject to a passive and obedient position and are not able to
bargain for employment contracts without a legal mandate); see also Yang Lixiong,
Problems of Migrant Workers and Social Protection in Chengdu, in ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG
WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RuRAL-URBAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA: ISSUES AND SOCIAL
PROTECTION] supra note 1, at 201, 203 (stating that some migrant workers under the
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Article 82 of the Labor Contract Law provides that if the
employer takes more than one month but less than one year to
execute a written labor contract with the employee, the em-
ployer must pay double wages before the contract is finally con-
cluded."' If an employer should, but did not, sign an open-en-
ded employment contract (employment contract with indefinite
contract period) within one year of employment, the employer
also must pay double wages to the employee until a contract is
signed. 4 ' In addition, Article 11 supplies standards of employ-
ment compensation when the employer does not execute a labor
contract with the employee.' 46 Article 18 addresses situations
when the terms of an employment contract are not clear. 147
2. Promoting Long-Term Employment Contracts
Observers view the prevalence of short-term contracts as
causing employment insecurity and instability. 141 Some believe
the Labor Law is partly responsible for this problem. The Labor
Law does not ask employers to pay severance pay to employees
upon the expiration of the employment contract, but require
pressure of finding employment are afraid to request their boss to execute a labor con-
tract); LiJianfei, supra note 115, at 76 (contending that in practice it is mainly in the
employer's power to decide whether to have a written labor contract).
144. See Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 82, 1.
145. See id. art. 82, 2.
146. Id. art. 11.
Providing that:
In the event that an Employer fails to conclude a written employment contract
with a worker at the time its starts to use him, and it is not clear what labor
compensation was agreed upon with the worker, the labor compensation of
the new worker shall be decided pursuant to the rate specified in the collective
contract; where there is no collective contract or the collective contract is si-
lent on the matter, equal pay shall be given for equal work.
Id.
147. Id. art. 18.
Providing that:
If a dispute arises due to the fact that the rate or standards for labor compen-
sation or working conditions, etc. are not explicitly specified in the employ-
ment contract, the Employer and the worker may renegotiate. If the negotia-
tions are unsuccessful, the provisions of the collective contract shall apply. If
there is no collective contract or the collective contract is silent on the issue of
labor compensation, equal pay shall be given for equal work; if there is no
collective contract or the collective contract is silent on the issue of working
conditions, the relevant regulations of the state shall apply.
Id.
148. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (explaining why Labor Law in-
advertently encourages employers to use short-term employment contracts).
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compensation to employees when employers terminate the con-
tract before its expiration. 149 To avoid or reduce compensation
payments for terminating an employment contract before its
due term, many employers choose to repeatedly make short-
term contracts with employees, including long-term employ-
ees.
1 50
Article 46 of the Labor Contract Law addresses this problem
by taking away from employers the economic advantage of short-
term employment contracts, requiring employers to pay sever-
ance pay upon expiration of even short-term employment con-
tracts, unless it is the employee who chooses not to renew the
contract on the same or better terms.15' In addition, in order to
promote long-term employment relations, Article 14 requires
the employer to offer an open-ended employment contract if the
worker has been working for the employer for a consecutive pe-
149. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 28 (providing that "[t]he employing unit shall
make economic compensations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State
if it revokes its labor contracts according to the stipulations in Article 24, Article 26 and
Article 27 of this Law.").
150. See Administrative Law Office of the Law Committee of the Standing Commit-
tee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 138, § 2, subsec. 2 (recognizing that the main reason
for employers to use short-term employment contract is to avoid paying compensation
upon terminating an employment contract); see also Rui Neixin, The Purpose, Background
and Major Systems of Labor Contract Legislation, 7 ZHONGGUO LAODONG [CHINA LABOR] 16
(2007) (stating that many employing units execute yearly short-term employment con-
tracts rather than long-term contracts to lower the cost of employment termination).
151. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 46.
Providing that:
In any of the following circumstances, the Employer shall pay the worker sev-
erance pay:
(1) the employment contract is terminated by the worker pursuant to Article
38 hereof;
(2) the employment contract is terminated after such termination was pro-
posed to the worker by the Employer pursuant to Article 36 hereof and the
parties reached agreement thereon after consultations;
(3) the employment contract is terminated by the Employer pursuant to Arti-
cle 40 hereof;
(4) the employment contract is terminated by the Employer pursuant to the
first paragraph of Article 41 hereof;
(5) the employment contract is a fixed-term contract that ends pursuant to
item (1) of Article 44 hereof, unless the worker does not agree to renew the
contract even though the conditions offered by the Employer are the same as
or better than those stipulated in the current contract;
(6) the employment contract ends pursuant to item (4) or (5) of Article 44
hereof,
(7) other circumstances specified in laws or administrative statutes.
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riod of no less than ten years, or if a fixed-term employment
contract with the worker has been concluded on two consecutive
occasions. 15 2
3. Invalid Employment Contracts and Security
Article 97 of the Labor Law states that if an employment
contract is invalid because of the employer's fault and causes
harm to the laborer, the employer shall be liable for damages.53
However, this provision says nothing about the employer's obli-
gation to pay labor compensation if the laborer has performed
labor under an invalid employment contract. 154  In practice,
when a labor dispute arises, the worker is often unable to obtain
a labor compensation award under the Labor Law because the
152. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 14.
Providing that:
An "open-ended employment contract" is an employment contract for which
the Employer and the worker have agreed not to stipulate a definite ending
date.
An Employer and a worker may conclude an open-ended employment con-
tract upon reaching a negotiated consensus. If a worker proposes or agrees to
renew his employment contract or to conclude an employment contract in any
of the following circumstances, an open-ended employment contract shall be
concluded, unless the worker requests the conclusion of a fixed-term employ-
ment contract:
(1) the worker has been working for the Employer for a consecutive period of
not less than 10 years;
(2) when his Employer introduces the employment contract system or the
state owned enterprise that employs him re-concludes its employment con-
tracts as a result of restructuring, the worker has been working for the Em-
ployer for a consecutive period of not less than 10 years and is less than 10
years away from his legal retirement age;
or
(3) prior to the renewal, a fixed-term employment contract was concluded on
two consecutive occasions and the worker is not characterized by any of the
circumstances set forth in Article 39 and items (1) and (2) of Article 40
hereof.
If an Employer fails to conclude a written employment contract with a worker
within one year from the date on which it starts using the worker, the Em-
ployer and the worker shall be deemed to have concluded an open-ended
employment contract.
Id.
153. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 97 (providing that "[tlhe employing unit shall
bear the responsibility for compensation if the conclusion of any invalid contracts is
attributed to the unit and have caused damages to laborers.").
154. See id.
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employment contract is invalid.155 For example, since the Labor
Law purports to regulate workers' labor relations with lawful em-
ployers, 11 6 employment contracts with enterprises that exist and
operate unlawfully are deemed invalid and workers who have
performed labor for such enterprises do not have the benefit of
Labor Law protection.157 This result is especially disturbing con-
sidering that laborers are often ignorant of whether the employ-
ing enterprise is not following the law.'55 The Labor Contract
Law addresses this problem. Article 28 requires the employer to
pay labor compensation even if the labor contract is invalid
under the law, 159 and Article 93 holds all employers, lawfully op-
erating and hiring or not, liable for paying workers' labor com-
pensation, severance pay, and damages.'60
155. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (observing that that invalid contracts
result in migrant workers' rights and interests being unprotected under labor laws).
156. See Dong Baohua, Analysis Of The Fundamental Positioning of The Draft Labor
Contract Law Of The People's Republic Of China, 3 FASHANG YANJIU [LAW AND BUSINESS
STUDY] 46, 49 (2006), available at http://www.cnlsslaw.com/list.asp?Unid=2424 (stating
that Labor Law only regulates employment of lawful employees by lawful employers and
may not apply if either the employer or the employee is unlawful); see also DONG, SHI &
WANG, supra note 103, at 13-14 (criticizing then-existing labor laws for making the law-
fulness of an employer determinative of the lawfulness of an employment relationship,
which in turn determines the applicability of labor laws (labor laws only protect lawful
employment relationships)).
157. See Dong, supra note 156, at 50 (criticizing draft Labor Contract Law for shar-
ing Labor Law's mistake in that they make the lawfulness of an employment relation-
ship dependent on the lawfulness of the employing enterprise's existence and opera-
tion, with the result that an employer's unlawfulness would cause the employment un-
lawful, the employment contract invalid and the employee unprotected under labor
law). The final version of Labor Contract Law avoids this mistake, as indicated infra
notes 152-53 and accompanying text; see, e.g., DONG, SHI & WANG, supra note 103, at 13
(reporting that because a migrant couple's employer did not have a business operation
certificate and thus operated business unlawfully, a People's Court in Beijing deemed
the couple's employment with the employer unlawful under labor law and denied them
protection of minimum wage regulations).
158. See More Than Ninety Percent of Migrant Workers Without Work Injury Insurance,
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINESE YOUTH POST], posted on China Labour Bulletin,
May 27, 2007, 5, http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/node/98895 (noting that migrant work-
ers, when seeking employment, lack the sophistication to seek verification of the em-
ployer's lawfulness, e.g., whether the employer has the required business operation li-
cense).
159. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 28 (providing that "[i]f an employment
contract is confirmed as invalid and the worker has already performed labor, the Em-
ployer shall pay the worker labor compensation. The amount of labor compensation
shall be determined with reference to the labor compensation of workers in the same
or a similar position with the Employer.").
160. Id. art. 93.
Providing that:
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It is well known that some employers seek to bind migrant
workers to their current employment not by providing attractive
wages or work conditions, but by retaining workers' resident
identification card and papers, requiring workers to provide se-
curity, or collecting property from workers under other
guises."' Article 9 of the Labor Contract Law bans this prac-
tice' 6 2 and Article 84 further provides for penalties for violations
of Article 9.16
An Employer that carries on business without the legal qualifications there-
fore [e] will be pursued according to law for its legal liability for its illegal and
criminal acts. If its workers have already performed labor, the Employer or its
investor(s) shall pay them labor compensation, severance pay and damages in
accordance with the relevant provisions of this Law. If the workers suffer harm
as a result thereof, the said unit shall be liable for damages.
Id.
161. See Yang Weihan & Chen Fei, Employing Units Shall Not Take Laborers'Identifica-
tion Documents, File And Security, XINHUA WAANG [XINHUA NET], Aug. 30, 2006, 1 1-3
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/30/content_5027681.htm (reporting
that some employers retain workers' resident ID card and papers and require workers
to provide security against terminating employment contract, in direct violation of ex-
plicit regulations by labor and social security administration, and that the People's Su-
preme Court (the highest court in China), in response, issued ajudicial interpretation
document on August 30, 2006, subjecting disputes arising out of this kind of abusive
practices adjudication); Cooney, supra note 2, at 1053-54 (noting that many employers
demand that workers pay a bond prior to commencing work, together with the reten-
tion of wages, in order to impose labor discipline and prevent staff turnover).
162. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 9 (providing that "[w]hen hiring a
worker, an Employer may not retain the worker's resident ID card or other papers, nor
may it require him to provide security or collect property from him under some other
guise.").
163. Id. art. 84.
Providing that:
If an Employer violates this Law by retaining a worker's resident ID card or
other papers, the labor administration authority shall order the same returned
to the worker within a specified period of time and impose a penalty in accor-
dance with the provisions of relevant laws.
If an Employer violates this Law by collection property from workers as secur-
ity or under some other guise, the labor administration authority shall order
the same returned to the workers within a specified period of time and impose
a fine on the Employer of not less than RMBY500 and not more than
RMBY2,000 for each person; if the workers suffered harm as a result of the
said conduct on the part of the Employer, the Employer will be liable for dam-
ages.
If an Employer retains a worker's file or other article after the worker has
terminated or ended his employment contract in accordance with the law, a
penalty shall be imposed in accordance with the preceding paragraph.
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4. Limiting the Probation Period
The Labor Contract also addresses the issue of abusive use
of the probation period or "trial use" period.1 64 Employers and
workers start a probation or "trial use" period by entering into a
temporary and probationary employment relationship.165 Dur-
ing the period, they get to know each other better and decide
whether they want to establish a full employment relationship.' 66
A worker receives less pay during a probation period and each
party retains the right to terminate the probation employment at
will without any liabilities.16 7
Labor Law Article 21 limits the probation period to six
months. 6 8 To evade Labor Law obligations associated with full
employment and to lower wage costs, some employers exten-
sively, or even repeatedly, use a probation period.'69 In re-
164. See Legal Information Bureau of National Information Center, What Is Proba-
tion Period In A Labor Contract?, 1 1-2, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-06/15/con-
tent.6646.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2008) (defining probation period as a period when
an employing unit evaluates a worker's integrity, work attitude, ability, and physical
conditions, etc., and asserting probation periods as beneficial to both employers and
employees for giving them time to observe and examine each other while retaining the
right to terminate the try-out period at will); see also Focus on Labor Contract Law: Proba-
tion Period Is Not Free Labor Period, MINZHU FAZHI ZHOUKAN [DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF
LAw WEEKLY] (China), posted on Renmin Wang [People Net], Apr. 5, 2006, 1 2 http://
npc.people.com.cn/GB/14957/53050/4271923.html (noting that employers pay less
wages in a probation period and may freely terminate a probationary employment rela-
tionship without incurring any compensation costs).
165. See Legal Information Bureau of National Information Center, supra note
164, 1 1-2 (indicating that the employment relationship between employers and work-
ers is temporary and probationary during the probation period); see also Focus on Labor
Contract Law: Probation Period Is Not Free Labor Period, supra note 164, 2 (indicating that
the employment relationship between a worker and an employer is temporary and non-
binding on either party).
166. See Probation Period Should Be Included In Chinese Labor Contracts, 2,
http://www.chinacsr.com/en/2007/09/17/1688-probation-period-should-be-included-
in-chinese-labor-contracts/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2008) (citing the Tianjin Municipal La-
bor and Social Security Department that the probationary or trial use period is for the
employer and the employee to mutually understand each other and make a mutual
employment decision).
167. See Focus on Labor Contract Law: Probation Period Is Not Free Labor Period, supra
note 164, 2 (observing that in a probation period workers receive lower wages and
each party is free to end the probationary employment relationship).
168. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 21 (providing that, "A probation period may be
agreed upon in a labor contract. The longest probation period shall not exceed six
months.").
169. See Focus on Labor Contract Law: Probation Period Is Not Free Labor Period, supra
note 164, 2 (stating that it is a serious problem that some enterprises abusively take
advantage of the probation period by extending its term, paying low wages, and arbi-
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sponse, Article 19 of the Labor Contract Law provides that an
employer can require only one probation period with a worker,
and that agreement on the probation period shall not stand
alone but must be accompanied by, and included as part of, a
contract for full employment. 170 If the term of the employment
contract is less than three months, no probation period is al-
lowed. 171 If the contract term is over three months but less than
one year, the probation period shall not exceed one month. 172
If the term is more than one year but less than three years, the
probation period shall not exceed two months.1 7  In no instance
can a probation period exceed six months.
1 74
Article 20 further states that the wage of a worker on proba-
tion may not be lower than the lowest wage for the same job paid
to a full employee, or less than eighty percent of the wage agreed
upon in a full employment contract, and may not be less than
the minimum wage in the place where the employer is lo-
cated.175 In addition, to counter employers' abusive use of pro-
trarily terminating the probationary employment); see also Xinhua She [Xinhua News
Agency] (China), Supplementing And Perfecting Existing Labor Contract System And Four
Bright Points Of Labor Contract Law, posted on Chinese government website, Aug. 3,
2007, § 3, 1, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-08/03/content_705670.htm (summariz-
ing the problems with probation period practice as prolonged probation period, low
wages and employers' arbitrary termination of probation employment).
170. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 19.
Providing that:
If an employment contract has a term of not less than three months but less
than one year, the probation period may not exceed one month; if an employ-
ment contract has a term of more than one year and less than three years, the
probation period may not exceed two months; and if an employment contract
has a term of not less than three years or is open-ended, the probation period
may not exceed six months.
An Employer may stipulate only one probation period with any given worker.
No probation period may be specified in an employment contract with a term
to expire upon completion of a certain job or an employment contract with a
term of less than three months.
The probation period shall be included in the term of the employment con-
tract. If an employment contract provides for a probation period only, then
there is no probation period and the term concerned shall be the term of the
employment contract.
Id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. art. 20 (stating that "[t]he wages of a worker on probation may not be
less than the lowest wage level for the same job with the Employer or less than eighty
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bation periods, Article 21 prohibits employers from arbitrarily
terminating probation employment, allowing termination only
on enumerated grounds.'7 6
5. Collective Labor Contracts and "Labor Dispatch"
Collective employment contracts may be of special value to
rural workers considering their inferior individual bargaining
power.' 77 Article 55 of the Labor Contract Law requires that the
terms of individual employment contracts be no less favorable to
the employee than the terms in a collective employment con-
tract with the employer, thus providing a safeguard to individual
workers against unconscionable contract terms.1 78 It is notewor-
thy that Article 53 of the Labor Contract Law further provides
for regional and industrial collective labor contracts.
179
percent of the wage agreed upon in the employment contract, and may not be less than
the minimum wage rate in the place where the Employer is located.").
176. Id. art. 20.
Providing that:
An Employer may not terminate an employment contract during the proba-
tion period unless the worker is characterized by any of the circumstances set
forth in Article 39 and items (1) and (2) of Article 40 hereof. If an Employer
terminates an employment contract during the probation period, it shall ex-
plain the reasons to the worker.
Id.
177. See Wen, supra note 66, at 628 (stating that because migrant workers' individ-
ual bargaining power is weak, employing units may force unreasonable employment
terms upon them, and that a collective employment contract may strengthen migrant
workers' bargaining power and prevent unreasonable employment terms); see also Li
Wei, Collective Contract: Can It Become Employees' New Right-Vindication-Weapon?, JIANC-A
RIBAO [PROCURATORIAL DAILY] (China), May 23, 2005, sec. 2, 2, http://www.jcrb.com/
nl/jcrb819/ca375478.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (citing Guo Keli, the Deputy
Chief of the Labor and Social Security Bureau of Beijing, that collective contracts are to
protect workers who are powerless individually compared to the enterprise); Brown,
supra note 38, at 48 (commenting that with individual control waning, collective negoti-
ations would improve workers' economic conditions).
178. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 55.
Providing that:
The rates for labor compensation, standards for working conditions, etc. stipu-
lated in a collective contract may not be lower than the minimum rates and
standards prescribed by the local People's Government. The rates for labor
compensation, standards for working conditions, etc. stipulated in the employ-
ment contract between an Employer and a worker may not be lower than
those stipulated in the collective contract.
Id.
179. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 53 (providing that "[i]ndustry-wide or
area-wide collective contracts may be concluded between the labor union on the one
hand and representatives on the side of the enterprises on the other hand in industries
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The phenomenon of "labor dispatch"' 0 has been growing
quickly and is vulnerable to abuses in the absence of statutory
regulations.18 ' Enterprises use dispatched laborers to lower
wage costs, reduce social security payments, and avoid obliga-
tions under the Labor Law.1 82 Some employers even lay off
workers and then re-employ them, or other workers, through the
arrangement of "labor dispatch" at lower wages and with fewer
labor benefits.18 3 Employers can do this because dispatched la-
borers are not considered their own employees and thus are not
entitled to full employment benefits under the Labor Law.'84
such as construction, mining, catering services, etc., within areas below the county
level.").
180. See Li Jianfei, Take the Vindication of Laborers' Rights in Labor Dispatch Seriously,
GONGREN RIBAO [WoRKERS DAILY] (China), posted on Renmin Wang [People Net] Feb.
26, 2007, 1, http://acftu.people.com.cn/GB/67574/5417163.html (last visited Oct.
25, 2008) (defining labor dispatch as a form of labor service whereby labor dispatching
companies provide labor services by sending their employees to work for, and under
the supervision of, companies that need labor services, while the workers remain em-
ployees of the labor dispatching companies); see also BAIDu BAIKE [PAIDU ENCYCLOPEDIA],
1 1, http://baike.baidu.com/view/15253.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2008) (explaining
that labor dispatch means that the labor dispatching unit sends its employees to work
for and work under the supervision of the labor receiving unit for a fee); What Is Labor
Dispatch?, 1 1, http://www.laodong66.com/ldanli/ldbc/225512793.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2008) (giving similar definition).
181. See BAIDU BIoKE [BAIDu ENCYCLOPEDIA], supra note 180, 1 3 (recognizing labor
dispatch as a relatively new form of labor employment in China, which has seen fast
growth and is riddled with various problems); see also Labor Dispatch Shall Not Be Left
Uncontrolled by Law, GONGREN RIBAO [WORKERS DAILY], posted on Renmin Wang [People
Net], May 14, 2007, 1 2, http://acftu.people.com.cn/GB/5725284.html (noting that
there are no laws regulating labor dispatch); Zhang Jinxian, Labor Dispatch Market Will
Obtain Regulations And Order, RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE'S COURT POST], posted on
Zhongguo Fayuan Wang [China Court Net], July 17, 2007, 1 1, http://
www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200707/17/256968.shtml (stating that Labor Con-
tract Law brings labor dispatch under the regulation of law).
182. See Li Jianfei, Take the Vindication of Laborers' Rights in Labor Dispatch Seriously,
supra note 180, 1 8 (stating that enterprises use dispatched laborers to reduce labor
costs, evade labor law obligations, and reduce payments of employee benefits as well as
social insurance premiums); see also Zhang, supra note 181, 1 (pointing out that many
enterprises, under the pretense of labor dispatch, refuse to execute employment con-
tracts with their workers and refuse to pay social security for workers).
183. See Labor Dispatch Shall Not Be Left Uncontrolled by Law, supra note 181, 1 6
(noting that some employing units lay off their employees and then have them back
through labor dispatch while paying them lower wages and fewer benefits, and that
some employing units replace their employees with dispatched laborers to reduce labor
costs); see also, Administrative Law Office of the Law Committee of the Standing Com-
mittee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 138 (stating that some employing units lay off their
workers and have them back as dispatched laborers).
184. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (observing that dispatched
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In response, the Labor Contract Law for the first time pro-
vides focused and comprehensive regulations on "labor dis-
patch" to protect the interests of dispatched workers,185 most of
whom are migrant workers. For example, Article 58 provides
that labor dispatching units shall pay monthly local minimum
wages to dispatched workers at times when the workers are not
dispatched for work.'" 6 Article 60 provides that labor dispatch-
ing units and labor accepting units shall not charge fees from
dispatched laborers.' 87 Article 63 states that dispatched workers
are entitled to the same pay as the employer's own employees
doing the same work.' Finally, Article 66 mandates that enter-
prises shall not set up labor dispatching units to dispatch work-
ers to themselves or their subsidiaries.18 9
workers are not employees of the labor dispatch receiving units and do not receive
benefits as employees).
185. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, arts. 57-67; see also Zhang, supra note 181,
1 (asserting that Labor Contract Law for the first time in China provides specific regula-
tions on labor dispatch).
186. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 58.
Stating that:
Staffing firms shall pay labor compensation on a monthly basis. During peri-
ods when there is no work for workers to be placed, the staffing firm shall pay
such workers compensation on a monthly basis at the minimum wage rate
prescribed by the People's Government of the place where the staffing firm is
located.
Id.
187. Id. art. 60.
Providing that:
Staffing firms shall inform the workers placed of the content of the placement
agreements.
Staffing firms may not pocket part of the labor compensation that the Ac-
cepting Units pay to the workers in accordance with the placement agree-
ment.
Staffing firms and the Accepting Units may not charge fees from the workers
placed.
Id.
188. Id. art. 63.
Stating that:
Placed workers shall have the right to receive the same pay as that received by
workers of the Accepting Unit for the same work. If an Accepting Unit has no
worker in the same position, the labor compensation shall be determined with
reference to the labor compensation paid in the place where the Accepting
Unit is located to workers in the same or a similar position.
Id.
189. Id. art. 66 (providing that "[e]mployers may not establish staffing firms to
place workers with themselves or their subordinate units.").
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6. Nationwide Unified Social Security Account System
As discussed above, the Labor Law requires employers to
pay their share of social security premiums for the benefit of
workers.' ° Article 100 of the Labor Law also imposes late fees
on employers who ignore a labor administrative bureau's order
to make up social security payments within a specified period.'
These provisions have had little compliance from medium and
small size enterprises.'9 2
The Labor Contract Law includes one new solution to this
problem. Article 49 states that the state will take measures to
establish a nationwide unified social security account system that
makes workers' social insurance accounts transferrable from one
region to another.1 " The lack of transferable personal social se-
curity account is a major obstacle to providing continuous social
security to migrant workers.19 4 As social security premiums are
collected and managed by regional governments,' 95 migrant
190. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (showing that Labor Law requires
employers to pay social security premiums for their employees).
191. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 100 (providing that "[t]he employing unit that
fails to pay social insurance premium without reason shall be ordered by the labor
administrative department to pay within fixed period of time. If the unit still fails to
make the payment beyond the time limit, an additional arrear payment may be de-
manded."). '
192. See Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, sec. 2, subsec. 4 (reporting that
many employees of privately-owned enterprises and small businesses, and most migrant
workers, do not have social security coverage); see also supra notes 56, 59 and accompa-
nying text (indicating that many migrant workers do not have social security coverage
such as health insurance, pension, and work injury insurance).
193. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 49 (providing that "lIt] he state will take
measures to establish a comprehensive system that enables workers' social insurance
accounts to be transferred from one region to another and to be continued in such
other region.").
194. See Survey and Research Team of MOLSS, Research Report on Social Security Is-
sues of Rural Workers, in PROJECT TEAM OF THE RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL,
ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG DIAOYAN BAOGAO [SuRvEY AND RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA'S
RURAL WORKERS] supra note 1, at 248, 250, 252 (recognizing that the low coverage rate
of social security for migrant workers is attributable to the fact that social security ac-
counts are not transferable across regions); see also Liu Wenhai, Commentary Analysis of
Social Security Systems for Migrant Workers in Certain Regions, in PROJECT TEAM OF THE RE-
SEARCH OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG DIAOYAN BAOGAO
(SURVEY AND RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA'S RURAL WoRKERs] supra note 1, at 260, 261
(observing that one of the three reasons why social security coverage rate is low with
respect to migrant workers is that because social security accounts are not transferable,
migrant workers' interests under social security are not guaranteed).
195. See Survey and Research Team of MOLSS, supra note 194, at 250 (stating that
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workers cannot bring their social security benefits along when
they move to other regions.196 Therefore, China's localized so-
cial security system constitutes a disincentive for migrant workers
to pay their share of social security premiums and many migrant
workers actually opt out of pension plans. 197 Once the govern-
ment establishes a transferable personal social security account
for all workers, it will no doubt encourage migrant workers to
pay their share of social security premiums for their own benefit.
7. Wage Arrears
Wage arrears is one of the most serious and challenging
problems faced by migrant workers, and accounts for forty-one
percent of all labor cases handled by Labor Security Supervision
and Inspection Bureaus in 2004.9 Labor Law Article 50 prohib-
its, "'99 Article 91 provides penalty against wage arrears, 20 0 and
there have been a series of serious governmental efforts to solve
China's social security system is divided into more than 2000 units, at the city or county
levels, that are not unified or connected).
196. See Survey and Research Team of MOLSS, supra note 194, at 249 (noting that
migrant workers lack confidence in the social security system and suspect whether they
will eventually have pension benefits even if they pay premiums for many years).
197. See Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, sec. 2, subsec. 4 (reporting that
because social security accounts are administered at county or city levels and are not
transferable across regions, migrant workers are not enthusiastic about participating in
social security system); see also supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (presenting
that inability to transfer social security account across regions contributes to the low
social security coverage rate of migrant workers).
198. See Legal Enforcement and Inspection Team of the Law Committee of the
Standing Committee of NPC (P.R.C.), supra note 48, sec. 2, subsec. 2 (noting that wage
arrears complaints account for forty-one percent of all labor cases handled by Labor
Security Supervision and Inspection Bureaus in 2004).
199. See Labor Law, supra note 83, art. 50.
200. Id. art. 91.
Stating that:
Where an employing unit infringes in any of the following ways the legitimate
rights and interests of laborers, the labor administrative department shall or-
der it to pay laborers remuneration or to make up for economic losses, and
may also order it to pay compensations: (1) to deduct wages or delay in paying
wages to laborers without reason; (2) to refuse to pay laborers remuneration
for the extended working hours; (3) to pay laborers wages below the local
standard on minimum wages; or (4) to fail to provide laborers with economic
compensations in accordance with the provisions of this Law after revocation
of labor contracts.
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this problem for migrant workers in the past few years.20 1 All of
these initiatives have merely had moderate success.20 2 In re-
sponse to this issue, the Labor Contract Law adds two protective
measures. Article 30 permits workers to apply for a wage-pay or-
der from local courts, 2°3 bypassing the mandatory arbitration
under the Labor Law and significantly reducing workers' waiting
period in obtaining a final order. And Article 85 requires em-
ployers to pay additional damages for overdue labor compensa-
tions.20 4
8. Labor Supervision and Inspection Responsibilities
Lack of government supervision and inspection of the im-
plementation of the Labor Law is to a large extent responsible
for massive labor right violations. 20 5 In this connection, China's
legislature added Article 95 to the Labor Contract Law in rapid
response to the widely publicized slave labor scandal in May and
201. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (showing that in the last few years
Chinese national and regional governments have made serious efforts to solve the wage
arrear problem for migrant workers).
202. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (showing that wage arrear remains a
serious problem for migrant workers).
203. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 30.
Providing that:
Employers shall pay their workers labor compensation on time and in full in
accordance with the employment contracts and state regulations.
If an Employer falls into arrears with the payment of labor compensation or
fails to make payment in full, the worker may, in accordance with the law,
apply to the local People's Court for an order to pay; and the People's Court
shall issue such order in accordance with the law,
Id.
204. Id. art. 85.
Providing that:
If an Employer:
(1) fails to pay a worker his labor compensation in full and on time as stipu-
lated in his employment contract or prescribed by the state;
(2) pays labor compensation below the local minimum wage rate;
(3) arranges overtime without paying overtime pay; or
(4) terminates or ends an employment contract without paying the worker
severance pay pursuant to this Law;
then the labor administration authority shall order it to pay the labor compen-
sation, overtime pay or severance pay within a specified period of time; if the
labor compensation is lower than the local minimum wage rate, the Employer
shall pay the shortfall. If payment is not made within the time limit, the Em-
ployer shall be ordered to additionally pay damages to the worker at.
Id.
205. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing that poor labor su-
pervision and inspection contribute to the prevalence of labor right violations).
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June of 2007.2o 6 Article 95 subjects labor administration clerks
and government officials to administrative sanctions and even
criminal liabilities if their failure to perform their job causes
harm to either workers or employers.20 7 This provision is similar
to Article 103 of the Labor Law.208
There are other provisions in the Labor Contract Law that
address either the insufficiencies of the Labor Law or known
abusive labor practices. For example, in practice, some employ-
ers either do not make a written employment contract with the
employee 219 or do not furnish a copy of the contract to the em-
ployee. 210 When labor disputes arise, workers often find it diffi-
cult to obtain legal remedies because they are not able to prove
206. See China's Legislature Approves New Labor Law, supra note 6 (reporting that a
provision added to Labor Contract Law at the last minute in response to the slavery
scandal would punish officials whose negligence or misconduct harms workers' rights);
see also Blanchette, supra note 10 (reporting that, following the exposure of the forced
labor scandals, draft Labor Contract Law was amended to punish officials who ignore
labor abuses with prison time or other penalties).
207. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 95.
Providing that:
If a labor administration authority, another competent authority or a member
of its working personnel neglects its/his duties, fails to perform its/his statu-
tory duties or exercises its/his authority in violation of the law, thereby causing
harm to a worker or an Employer, liability for damages shall be borne and the
leading official directly in charge and the other persons directly responsible
shall be subjected to administrative penalties in accordance with the law; if a
criminal offense is constituted, criminal liability shall be pursued in accor-
dance with the law.
Id.
208. Labor Law, supra note 30, art. 103.
Providing that:
The functionaries of the labor administrative department or other relevant
departments who abuse their functions and powers, neglect their duties, and
engage in malpractices for selfish ends, shall be investigated for criminal re-
sponsibilities according to law if a crime is constituted, or shall be given an
administrative sanction if the offenses do not yet constitute a crime.
Id.
209. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (observing that many employers do
not execute a labor contract with migrant workers).
210. See Lu Quan & Qin Li, Problems of Migrant Workers and Social Protection in Beij-
ing, in ZHONGGUO NONGMINGONG WENTI YU SHEHUI BAOHU [RURAL-URBAN MIGRANT
WORKERS IN CHINA: ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION] supra note 1, at 119, 127 (showing
that a survey in Beijing indicates that 36.1% migrant workers in Beijing have an employ-
ment contract, 66.4% employment contracts are in writing and, with respect to migrant
workers under a written labor contract, only 38.3% actually possess a copy of the written
contract); see also Yang, supra note 116, at 203 (stating that a survey in Chengdu shows
that 45.5% of migrant workers do not have an employment contract and only 70.3% of
migrant workers under a written labor contract hold a copy of the contract).
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the existence of an employment relationship with the em-
ployer.211 Article 16 of the Labor Contract Law deals with this
problem by mandating that the employee possess a copy of the
written employment contract.212 In addition, to protect workers
from unsafe working conditions, Article 32 of the Labor Con-
tract Law grants workers the right and power to refuse unsafe
work or work in unsafe conditions.213
Many provisions of the Labor Contract Law deliberately ad-
dress issues arising out of China's labor practice and attempt to
improve upon the deficiencies of the Labor Law, the Labor Con-
tract Law. As discussed in Part III of this Comment however, the
Labor Contract Law has its insufficiencies and its real effects on
labor practice in China remain to be seen.
III. INSUFFICIENCIES AND LIKELY EFFECTS OF THE LABOR
CONTRACT LAW
It is understandable that the Labor Contract Law, like any
remedial legislation, may not provide perfect solutions to all im-
portant issues. This Part discusses the insufficiencies of the law
and its likely effects on labor protection.
A. Employment Without a Written Contract
As discussed above, absent a written employment contract,
when labor disputes arise, it is often difficult for the worker to
211. See DONG, SHI & WANG, supra note 103, at 45 (commenting that a worker's
inability to produce a written employment contract makes it hard to prove an employ-
ment relationship with the employer and thus may deprive him or her of legal reme-
dies); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text (stating that failure to establish
employment relationship with the employer results in deprivation of legal remedies on
the part of workers).
212. Labor Contract Law, supra note 6, art. 16 (providing that "[a]n employment
contract shall become effective when the Employer and the worker have reached a
negotiated consensus thereon and each of them has signed or sealed the text of such
contract. The Employer and the worker shall each hold one copy of the employment
contract.").
213. Id. art. 32.
Providing that:
Workers shall not be held in breach of their employment contracts if they
refuse to perform dangerous operations that are instructed in violation of reg-
ulations or peremptorily ordered by management staff of the Employer.
Workers have the right to criticize, report to the authorities or lodge accusa-
tions against their Employers in respect of working conditions that endanger
their lives or health.
2009] 1127
1128 FORDHAMIN-TERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1083
prove an employment relationship with her employer. 214 Failure
to prove a factual labor relationship often deprives the worker of
Labor Law remedies.215 In response, Article 14 of the Labor
Contract Law states that if the employer does not sign a written
labor contract within one year after employment begins, the em-
ployer is deemed to have signed an open-ended labor contract
with the employee. 216 By legally constructing the existence of a
written employment contract, this provision seems to spare the
worker the burden of proving an employment relationship when
making a labor right claim against the employer. However, this
alleviation is to a large extent illusive. The worker still has to
prove that she has in fact worked for the employer for over one
year, therefore the worker's burden of proving factual employ-
ment relations remains. 211
Another issue with Article 14 is that it constructs the exis-
tence of an open-ended employment contract, but gives no
guidelines for constructing the important terms of the con-
tract.218 This problem may arguably be solved by looking at
other provisions of the Labor Contract Law. Article 11 deals
with the situation where an employment contract is not signed
and the terms of labor compensation are not specified.219 Arti-
cle 18 addresses the interpretation of labor contracts with vague
terms. 2 20 Both of these Articles may be taken as indirectly pro-
viding some guidelines for making out the important terms of a
legally constructed open-ended employment contract.
214. See supra notes 49, 134 and accompanying text (pointing out that without a
written employment contract, it is often difficult for a worker to produce evidence
showing that she has been employed by the employer).
215. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining that failure to prove
employment relationship with the employer deprives the worker of labor law reme-
dies).
216. See supra notes 136, 152 and accompanying text (citing Labor Contract Law
Article 14).
217. This may not be taken as a weakness of Labor Contract Law, as proof of fac-
tual employment relation, in absence of a written employment contract, seems both
reasonable and necessary in order for a worker to claim employment benefits.
218. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (quoting Labor Contract Law Arti-
cle 14).
219. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (quoting and summarizing Labor
Contract Law Article 11).
220. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (quoting and summarizing Labor
Contract Law Article 18).
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B. Wage Arrears
In response to the severe problem of wage arrears, the La-
bor Contract Law adds two protective measures that do not seem
sufficient. Article 30 permits workers to apply for a wage-pay or-
der from local courts221 and Article 85 requires employers to pay
additional damages for overdue labor compensation. 222 How-
ever, one may very well doubt if these provisions will have any
significant effect. Aside from the difficulty in obtaining a court
order, one may wonder how much good a court order can do
when administrative orders fail. One may also wonder how
workers can expect to receive payment of additional damages
when even wages are often overdue or merely partially paid.
C. Social Security
As discussed above, many employers, in violation of the La-
bor Law, do not pay their share of social security premiums for
the benefit of workers. 23 It comes as a surprise that the Labor
Contract Law does not provide for any penalty for employers
who do not pay social security premiums. Article 49 of the La-
bor Contract law states that the state will take measures to estab-
lish a nationwide unified social security account system that
makes workers' social insurance accounts transferrable from one
region to another. 224 The establishment of a nationwide unified
social security account system will no doubt alleviate migrant
workers' concern that their social security payments will bring
no benefits to them at all, thus providing migrant workers with
incentives to pay their share of social security premiums. How-
ever, this short single-sentence provision neither specifies the
measures the government shall take to set up a nationwide uni-
fied social security account system nor sets any timetable for the
establishment of such a system. In addition, a nationwide uni-
fied social security account system does not provide any addi-
221. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (quoting and summarizing Labor
Contract Law Article 30)
222. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (quoting and summarizing Labor
Contract Law Article 85)
223. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (pointing out that many medium
and small business employers do not pay social security premium for their employees,
resulting in a low social security coverage rate of migrant workers).
224. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (quoting and summarizing Labor
Contract Law Article 49).
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tional inducement for employers to pay their share of social se-
curity premiums. Since employers often choose to evade social
security payment to lower operation costs, the Labor Contract
Law fails to provide an adequate measure to enhance social se-
curity coverage for migrant workers.
D. Labor Supervision and Inspection
Lack of government supervision and inspection of the im-
plementation of the Labor Law is to a large extent responsible
for massive labor rights violations.225 In this regard, Article 95 of
the Labor Contract Law imposes penalties on labor administra-
tion clerks and government officials if their failure to perform
their job causes harm to workers or employers.226 Nevertheless,
this provision does not provide a promising prospect for the im-
plementation and enforcement of the Labor Contract Law, as
the Labor Law has already had a similar provision (Article 103)
that has not proven very effective.2 27 A comparison of the two
provisions shows that the only difference between them is that
the Labor Contract Law, in addition, requires the labor adminis-
trative authority to pay damages if its action or inaction causes
harm. It is doubtful that the addition of financial liability will
provide significantly more incentives for labor administrative au-
thorities to improve their performance. As regional govern-
ments play a critical role in the implementation and enforce-
ment of labor standards,2 2 8 it is no less important to provide lo-
cal government officials with strong incentives to enhance labor
practice within their region. This may be achieved by linking
the promotion of regional officials to the improvement of re-
gional labor conditions, instead of assessing an official's per-
formance based disproportionately on regional economic
growth. Strengthening enforcement of the Labor Contract Law
225. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing that lax supervision
and inspection of the implementation of labor laws contribute to the prevalence of
labor right violations).
226. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (quoting and paraphrasing Labor
Contract Law Article 95).
227. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (quoting Labor Law Article 103).
228. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (noting that local governments
play a critical role in the implementation and enforcement of labor laws because it is
the local governments that determine personnel and funding of labor supervision bu-
reaus; and stating that some local governments are half-hearted towards the protection
of labor rights).
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is of particular importance as poor implementation will defeat
any progressive legislation. This is particularly so as noncompli-
ance with laws is a serious problem in China. For this reason,
the effects of the Labor Contract Law on Chinese labor protec-
tion depend on, more than anything else, implementation and
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has discussed the social and legislative back-
ground, the provisions, and the possible effects of China's newly
enacted Labor Contract Law. China's Labor Contract Law draws
upon China's relatively new experience with employment con-
tracts, aims at supplementing and improving upon China's La-
bor Law, and sets out to address various forms of labor right vio-
lations against workers, mostly migrant workers. Given the prob-
lem of noncompliance and lack of legal enforcement in China,
one cannot expect China's Labor Contract Law to effect imme-
diate and significant changes. Besides enhancing labor supervi-
sion and legal enforcement, China needs to utilize economic in-
centives to induce compliance from employers.
If poor labor practice is to some extent a result of labor sur-
plus and an under-developed economy, China has a long way to
go to catch up with labor practices in the West. Although a polit-
ical slogan, China's current administration's goal of building a
"harmonious society" has led to unprecedented efforts to im-
prove the conditions of the disadvantaged and the poor, which is
surely good news to Chinese workers.
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